


HARRY F. WARD

THE STORY OF
AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
1917-1959

E183
.8
.R9W2




E183
.8
.R9W2

**THE STORY
OF
AMERICAN-SOVIET
RELATIONS**

1917-1959

by


DR. HARRY F. WARD



E183

.8

.R9W2



THE STORY OF AMERICAN-SOVIET RELATIONS
1917-1959

✓
by **DR. HARRY F. WARD**


Published by
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP
114 East 32nd St. New York 16, N. Y.
November, 1959

Price 50¢



5 copies for \$2.00
10 copies for \$3.50
20 copies for \$6.00

PRINTED IN U.S.A.



ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Dr. Ward is Professor-emeritus of Christian Ethics at Union Theological Seminary, New York. He has been a recognized authority on the Soviet Union well beyond a quarter of a century. Returning from an extended visit and study in the Soviet Union, he wrote *In Place of Profit* (1933). A second book *The Soviet Spirit* (1944) interpreted Soviet life during World War II. He is also the author of a widely-read pamphlet *Soviet Democracy* (1947). American religious and secular journals, as well as those abroad, have carried major articles by Dr. Ward through many years.

Foreword

We can be grateful that President Eisenhower and Premier Khrushchev, representing the people of the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. are now facing seriously the challenge to end the cold war between the two countries.

It is a challenge to be faced not alone by the leaders but by their peoples. The cold war has not been of brief duration. In a sense, it may be said that it began the day the Soviet Union was born. Its course has profoundly affected the history of both countries and the life of the entire world.

Constructive efforts of the leaders to end the cold war must reckon with the course of American-Soviet relations from the beginning to the present. If we, the people, are to help, we, too, must examine the record. Here in this pamphlet is the record; set down rather briefly, it is true, so that he who runs can read, but nevertheless well documented and authoritative. Since his first visit to the Soviet Union in 1932, and even before, Dr. Ward has been a student of Soviet policies at home and abroad. He has written two memorable books: *In Place of Profit* and *The Soviet Spirit* dealing with the Soviet Union, a pamphlet *Soviet Democracy* and scores of articles.

We are glad that Dr. Ward has written this *Story of American-Soviet Relations*: glad that he has made his well-considered interpretations of the factual record. Although we may not all agree with the severity of some of his judgments, we are deeply grateful to him for placing before us so eloquently and sharply the deep moral issues that make clearer than ever the obligation of us all to renew efforts to bring about the warless world he envisions. Dr. Ward's story deserves careful reading.

Dr. Ward's stern realism compels a full assessment of the forces striving to keep alive the arms race and the cold war. Yet we believe he is hopeful that the two nations and their peoples will meet the challenge of such forces with an agreed policy peacefully to coexist and cooperate to end the threat of mutual annihilation and world destruction. We in the National Council are hopeful, too. Indeed, we believe that tomorrow's story will be one of American-Soviet friendship and a world at peace, if we all do our part to make it so.

— National Council of American-Soviet Friendship

November 16, 1959

ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

In addition to the authors quoted, I am gratefully indebted to:

We Can Be Friends by CARL MARZANI. A most valuable book for data concerning the origins and development of the cold war, especially helpful in preparing the chapter on this subject.

American Quarterly on the Soviet Union. Nov. 1940. For the record of cultural exchanges between the United States and the Soviet Union in the 1930's.

VICTOR PERLO for information concerning economic relations between the United States and the Soviet Union.

JESSICA SMITH for constructive suggestions, and information concerning various points.

HARRY F. WARD

I.

Introduction

A REVIEW of American-Soviet relations since the agreement of November 16, 1933, to establish formal diplomatic ties, must naturally be more than an account of the diplomatic moves of the two governments. Its main concern has to be with the basic fact that these governments speak and act for differing forms of society and the economic orders which sustain them. The question to which those who seek permanent friendship between these two peoples have to find the answers is how these differing social orders can live together peaceably.

This kind of living together became imperative when the Soviet Union demonstrated that coexistence was a settled fact by becoming the world's second great industrial power. What took several centuries in England and Western Europe in the economic relations between feudal and capitalist society has, in our day, taken less than a lifetime in the relations between capitalist and socialist society. This is because the technical know-how of industrialism developed in the capitalist period is now available for other forms of society.

The imperative that coexistence become peaceful and beneficial to the future of mankind was made absolute by the appearance of atomic and nuclear weapons. If the foundations of peaceful coexistence had been laid before the discovery of atomic and nuclear energy, their terrific power could have been applied to the peaceful, constructive activities of mankind. All the world now knows that for the great industrial nations, and an undetermined part of the rest of mankind, it is now either peaceful coexistence or warring coextinction. The extreme militarists who delude themselves into believing that superiority of weapons will enable their nations to escape the threatened destruction and racial debilitation are the successors of those about whom it was said in ancient Rome "Whom the gods will destroy they first make mad."

Consequently the test of every move of the United States and the Soviet Union across the diplomatic chessboard is whether it helps or hinders the two nations and the rest of the world in their dire need to escape the nuclear weapons threat. Detailed examination of the data is, of course, impossible in a pamphlet. All that can be attempted is to get a correct perspective on the movement of the opposing forces, and on what now needs to be done, by looking at the decisive moves since the establishment of diplomatic relations. First, however, it is necessary to take a glimpse at the events in the period between the organization of the first Socialist Soviet Republic and diplomatic recognition by the United States that influenced the later course of US-USSR relations.

The most decisive event affecting the attitude of the new socialist society toward the rest of the world occurred soon after the Bolsheviks* came to power. It opened up the prospect that a basic change in the organization of society could be accomplished without a devastating series of wars. It assumed that instead of being achieved at heavy cost through the conflict of antagonistic forces blindly fighting for immediate ends, the progress of mankind could be guided toward a distant future by reason and goodwill, and by mutual interests. That event was Soviet recognition of the necessity of peaceful coexistence of differing social and economic systems.

The record begins with the first decree passed by the infant Soviet Government in November, 1917. It proposed to all nations taking part in World War I the opening of negotiations for a just and lasting peace. Two years later the All-Russian Congress of Soviets made a declaration which expressed the turn from dependence on world revolution to building socialism in one country as a demonstration to the rest of the world. It said that the Soviet Republic "desires to live in peace with all nations and to devote all energies to the work of internal construction." Thus Soviet policy united national security with universal needs.

A year later Lenin reported to the Ninth All-Russian Congress of Soviets: "Having undertaken our peaceful construction work, we shall bend all efforts to continue without interruption." This declaration enlarged the objectives of the struggle for peace from the avoiding of war to the ending of war.

*The majority group of the Russian Social Democratic Party which subsequently became the Communist Party.

The more the Soviets build, and plan to build, the more they need a warless world. As an old peasant put it recently to Supreme Court Justice William O. Douglas "We have more important things to do than fighting."

And in reporting on the new Seven-Year Plan of economic development to the special 21st Congress of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union, January 27, 1959, Nikita Khrushchev, Soviet Premier and First Party Secretary declared the plan

. . . is a challenge to compete in the peaceful development of our economies and in raising people's living standards . . .

We offer the capitalist countries peaceful competition . . .

All nations can see that our plans are plans for peaceful construction. We call on all people to work harder for peace. For our part we shall do everything in our power to insure peace throughout the world.

Here the push of practical necessity joins the pull of an ancient ideal. Our rejection of Soviet proposals for peaceful coexistence and disarmament has blindly ignored the degree to which this goal expresses the strongest self interest on both sides. Consequently we are in danger of losing an opportunity for unprecedented progress for all mankind. Also we have blinded ourselves to one of the great lessons of history — that when the self interest of a nation coincides with the need of all then a significant moral advance is possible.

An important event in the early days of the Soviet Republic, working against peaceful coexistence and vitally affecting the relations between us, was the Allied intervention. In this event, and the causes that led up to it, there appears the beginning of the pattern of emotions and attitudes that have expressed themselves in the cold war.

Allied Intervention

Intervention grew out of the desire to destroy the world's first Socialist state, and the differing interest of the Soviets and the Allies in the continuance of World War I. The Allies regarded the maintenance of the Eastern front against Germany as vital. Lenin had united the Soviets of workers, peasants and soldiers under the slogan, "Peace, Bread and Land" and the Bolsheviks had to deliver. Their government had neither the forces nor the supplies to continue fighting. Consequently one of the first acts of the

Congress of Soviets was a Decree of Peace. It called for a general settlement with no annexations and no indemnities.

The Soviet Government started armistice negotiations with Germany and sought a peace conference with the Allies. Twice they suspended the negotiations at Brest Litovsk while appealing for representatives from the other nations. Finally they served notice that unless answer came they would have to make a separate peace. The Germans served an ultimatum which said sign or we march in and take over. So the Bolsheviks signed. Even then they delayed ratification a week while they tried to find out what aid the Allies would give them if they refused. No word came so they had to sign and on March 16, 1918, Russia was out of the war.

Intervention came immediately. It is impossible here to go into the whole complex story. The undeniable, over-all fact is that fourteen nations, including our own, joined in an undeclared war against the Soviet Republic. They invaded its territory and killed its people. They aided counter-revolutionary leaders to set up governments in various parts of Russia. Most of them were Tsarist generals who had been given amnesty by the Bolsheviks on the expressed condition that they would not take up arms against the Soviet Government. This was an attempt to overthrow that government by force and violence, to impose a government which would be a partner with the capitalist world, and for some of the Allies to take territory and natural resources to which they had no right.

In the summer of 1919 the Allies, without our participation, recognized Admiral Kolchak as the supreme ruler of Russia. However, it turned out in the end that we had advanced more financial and military supplies to Kolchak than the rest of the Allies.

At one point the Soviet Government was forced back into less than a quarter of its original territory, cut off from its principal sources of food, fuel and raw materials. Its factories were almost at a standstill and much of the population was near starvation. It could not have survived but for the almost miraculous efforts of its people, both in and behind the armed forces. This is proof positive of which kind of government the majority of the people wanted.

Armed intervention ended January, 1920, (except for continued occupation of Far Eastern Areas) as unofficially as it had begun. It left a deep wound in the young socialist society. It took lives and energies that were needed for its building. It delayed the

growth of the mutual trust and confidence necessary for finding ways other than war to settle the differences between an old and a new economic order. At the time of the establishment of diplomatic relations in 1933, after examining all the documents about President Wilson's desires and intentions, the Soviet Union waived all claims arising out of our activities in Siberia. But the scar was there and when the weather got rough the wound ached.

As late as 1932 the funnel of the last of the British invading gunboats was still sticking up above the water off Baku. In every labor hall in the oilfields there was a picture of 22 Soviet labor leaders standing against a wall to be shot by a British firing squad at the command of an officer, posed with his riding crop, in typical imperialist arrogance.

A Propaganda Campaign

The intervention, added to the reactions here against Soviet nationalization of industry and cancellation of Tsarist debts, produced a propaganda campaign against the Soviets, for which no falsehood was too base. Their getting out of the war generated charges that the Bolshevik leaders were German agents. Our Committee of Public Information published documents purporting to prove this. They were later found to have been forgeries.

This propaganda campaign, started largely by White Russians here, created the hysterical fear and the fanatical hatred of communism and Communists which planned and supported the 1920 Palmer raids and deportations—the worst attack on the Bill of Rights since the 1789 anti-alien legislation. This, in turn, affected our relations with Soviet Russia. Ludwig Martens, the first representative the Soviet Republic sent here, commissioned to make soundings concerning the possibility of diplomatic relations, was arrested and deported solely on the ground that he was employed by the Soviet Government.

A similar growth proceeded in the use of economic as well as military pressures. In this matter there was a strange situation when the war ended. The Versailles Peace Conference that made the terms of the peace lifted the Allied blockade from the Central Powers; but it was still continued against Soviet Russia by the United States. This was because we had refused to join the Allied blockade on the ground that search of neutral vessels was contrary to our concept of international law. But we organized a blockade

of our own by a series of measures requiring licenses for all exports to Russia and then refusing to issue them.

Against the campaign of lying propaganda and its consequences a counter force appeared, led by men who could tell the truth about the Russian people and the Soviet Government because they had seen the birth of the Soviet Republic, and the early struggles of its creators and supporters, with their own eyes. They were such top ranking journalists as John Reed, Albert Rhys Williams, Bessie Beatty and Lincoln Steffens; administrators of the caliber of Col. William Boyce Thompson and Col. Raymond Robins who, in turn, headed the Red Cross Mission that went to Russia in 1917; philanthropist Jerome Davis, in charge of Y.M.C.A. work in Russia. These and others were listened to by Senator William Borah of Iowa, Senator Joseph France of Maryland and others high in the government who worked to change our official policy. During the intervention many of our dock workers, like their British counterparts, refused to load arms to be used against the people of Russia. The end result was a large body of public opinion which desired and worked for a friendly attitude from this country toward the Soviets.

All this, however, was not strong enough to prevent the emotions and attitudes generated by the intervention, the propaganda and the political repression it produced, which kept the United States from recognizing the Soviet Union long after other nations did so under the pressure of diplomatic and economic needs. The forces responsible for this delay matured later in the cold war. In the meantime, however, there was a period in which the counter forces working for the ending of war and peaceful coexistence made themselves felt. For its part, as soon as the intervention ended, the Soviet Republic entered upon a course of seeking peaceful relations with all the states along its borders and with the rest of the world.

II.

Between Intervention and Diplomatic Relations

IN THE SPAN between intervention and establishment of diplomatic relations, the forces working for peaceful coexistence and disarmament outran those making for the cold war. This was mainly due to the pressure of economic need. The United States needed to sell; the Soviet Union needed to buy. It had to replace the losses due to seven years of war, international and civil. Then came the larger demand due to the expansion of the economy and the spread of industrialization. The main increase of trade in the early years was in grain, cotton and agricultural machinery.

Economic Relations

Further business was progressively held back by the refusal of a trade agreement; the withholding of normal credit facilities; the rejection of Soviet gold on the ground that its title was in dispute; the blocking of Soviet sales in our market by prohibitive duties, and in special cases bans from charges of dumping and use of convict labor. (Only two of those cases stood up in court.) These bans also injured our own economy. Among the products shut out by months and even years of investigations were some which we cannot produce in sufficient quantity—mainly asbestos, manganese and apatite.

To handle the growing purchases the Soviet Government, besides appointing some special commissions, organized in 1924 under the laws of the State of New York, the Amtorg Trading Corporation, amalgamating two earlier commercial organizations. In 1926 American firms doing business with the Soviets reorganized the American-Russian Chamber of Commerce with an office in Moscow as well as New York.

During the New Economic Policy, when some forms of private business were temporarily restored in the USSR, a number of concessions were granted to foreign capital, mostly British. However, American firms got several of the larger ones, which added somewhat to the growing economic intercourse.

During the years 1921-23, the volume of trade with Russia was increased by the purchase of supplies in connection with the American Relief Administration's work in lessening the suffering caused by the famine of those years. It was the worst in the history of the great Volga bread basket and was dooming millions to death from starvation and typhus. The head of the ARA was Herbert Hoover, then Secretary of Commerce. The House of Representatives appropriated \$20,000,000 for the purchase of food supplies for Russian Relief. The Senate authorized the transfer, without charge, of certain surplus materials, mainly medicine, of the War Department to the ARA in Russia.

Altogether the ARA collected from all sources over \$66,300,000 for food, medical and other needed supplies. The work was carried out successfully, despite preliminary difficulties in negotiating an agreement due to suspicions on the part of the Russians as to the motives of Mr. Hoover, whose anti-Soviet bias was well known. The Soviet Government provided transport and housing, pledged no interference with relief distribution, while the United States promised no discrimination and no anti-Soviet activities or propaganda. In addition, the United States accepted payment of about \$10,000,000 in Russian gold for purchase of seed and of additional foodstuffs. Besides the economic lift, this undertaking naturally increased the goodwill necessary for peaceful coexistence, although the famine relief had only a semi-official status.

The ARA relief work was supplemented by the efforts of numerous unofficial agencies. The American Friends' Service Committee (Quakers) played a very large role in this. It raised extensive funds for food, medicine, clothing and other supplies and sent groups to help administer them under the ARA. Other religious groups helped, the American Red Cross, the Jewish Joint Distribution Committee, trade unions, agricultural associations, the Friends of the Soviet Union and many others. Physicians organized a society for medical aid to send instruments and supplies to hospitals and clinics which had been deprived of the barest necessities by the Allied blockade.

The combined semi-official and unofficial efforts were estimated to have saved over ten million lives. Also they built up a reservoir of goodwill and friendship. The Soviet Government has repeatedly expressed appreciation for this contribution to the life of their nation. A citation to Hoover, at the time, expressing deep gratitude, stated that the Soviet peoples "never will forget this aid rendered to them by the American people, holding it to be a pledge of the friendship of the two nations."

Our biggest economic aid to Russia in that period, also producing much more goodwill, was through the technical assistance contracts initiated in 1928 at the beginning of the First Five-Year Plan, some of them running through to the end of the Second Five-Year Plan. According to U. S. Department of Commerce figures, our largest volume of trade with Russia, except for World War II, was during the First Five-Year Plan.

This fact has much significance for the possibility of achieving peaceful coexistence. The success of the First Five-Year Plan was essential to the development of socialist society, and our contribution to that success was important both in materials and technical personnel. The best known achievement was the work of Colonel Hugh Cooper on the first great Soviet hydroelectric project — the Dnieper Dam and power plant.

Soviet administrators were much impressed by a quality they found in our technicians which was akin to one of their basic attitudes, and which they did not find in the engineers from other lands. As the manager of one plant put it to an investigator from the United States, if there was a defective part or piece of metal that needed to go to the office for analysis, the engineer from another country would wait until a laborer could be detached from other work to carry it, the American would pick it up and take it himself. He said that when a sudden hard freeze threatened to ruin a new blast furnace almost completed, the American took his coat off and pitched in with the workers rushing to get the last cement in place and set by artificial heat.

In the early days of our economic imperialism it used to be said that trade followed the flag (of the warship). In our time, when the development of enough goodwill to remove the threat of a lifeless world is essential, it is necessary to remember that trade — in the larger sense of mutually beneficial economic dealings — begets goodwill. In the 'twenties the goodwill created by our con-

tribution to Soviet economic success, added to that generated by our relief work, was sufficient to minimize the friction, suspicion and hostility produced by some of our political actions—for instance, the refusal to invite the Soviet Union to international gatherings, and then to attend those to which they had been invited; what the Soviets considered unwarranted interference in the conflict and negotiations between the USSR and China over the Chinese Eastern Railway, of which the Soviet Union, by agreement with China, was the administrator.

This growing goodwill was also sufficient to weaken our refusal of recognition on the ground that the Soviet Government was engaged in promoting world revolution through the Comintern. Also it nullified the reply of Secretary of State Hughes to the Soviet appeal for establishment of diplomatic relations in order to help trade to increase: “. . . it is idle,” he said, “to expect resumption of trade until the economic bases of production are securely established. Production is conditioned upon the safety of life, the recognition of firm guarantees of private property and the sanctity of contracts and the rights of free labor.” This is a foretaste of the false moral superiority claimed in our cold war propaganda.

The significance of US aid to the First Soviet Five-Year Plan for our situation today is that while it was helping to make socialist economy work it was also aiding our machine tool industry to pull out of the Great Depression. Thus while it aided socialist economy to come to maturity quicker it also helped to prolong the life of capitalist economy. While this is being done, providing disarmament proceeds, the tendency toward war is being checked and its possibility removed. Since war would destroy both economies, and most of the people they sustain, it becomes not only worth while but necessary for both sides to help each other to keep going until the question of what kind of economy the peoples of the world want is settled by experience and observation, through trial and error.

It is also worth noting that during this period “people to people” contact was developing, a forerunner of what is happening on a much larger scale today. Balancing the never-ending flood of anti-Soviet books and propaganda, were an increasing number of friendly reports on the achievements of the Soviet Union. Travel increased between the two countries. Numerous groups of Con-

gressmen, professional people and labor leaders visited Soviet Russia and reported back to the American people. Typical of these was the first American Trade Union delegation of 1927, which included such diverse figures as James Maurer, then head of the Pennsylvania State Federation of Labor, John Brophy of the Mine Workers, with Stuart Chase, Robert Dunn and Rexford Guy Tugwell as advisers. The delegation published their findings in an excellent book, *Soviet Russia in the Second Decade* (John Day, 1928). All this helped to create a growing demand among the American people for the establishment of normal and friendly relations with the Soviet Union.

Diplomatic Relations Established

It is generally recognized that the desire to increase economic relations was a dominant factor in our recognition of the Soviet Government. It played a part in getting us out of almost total breakdown. Our exports to, and imports from, the Soviet Union had fallen off sharply in 1931. In July '33 the Reconstruction Finance Corporation ended the credit refusal by advancing funds to Amtorg to buy our cotton.

In October of that year, President Franklin D. Roosevelt invited President Mikhail I. Kalinin to send representatives "to explore with me personally all questions outstanding between our countries." He thought it regrettable that the millions of people of the United States and Russia "should now be without a practical method of communicating with each other." He said that from the beginning of his administration he had "contemplated the desirability of an effort to end the present abnormal relations."

In March '33 President Roosevelt communicated directly with President Kalinin concerning his proposal to 54 nations regarding disarmament and economic reconstruction. Thereafter the Soviet Government participated in the World Economic Conference in London.

President Kalinin reciprocated these sentiments and further took the liberty to express the opinion that the "abnormal situation" referred to "has an unfavorable effect not only on the interests of the two states concerned but also on the general international situation, increasing the element of disquiet, complicating the process of consolidating world peace and encouraging forces tending to disturb that peace." He appointed Maxim M. Litvinov,

People's Commissar for Foreign Affairs, as the representative of the Soviet Government to discuss with President Roosevelt "questions of interest to our countries."

On November 16, 1933, President Roosevelt and Commissar Litvinov exchanged notes containing the decision to establish normal diplomatic relations between their respective governments, and to exchange ambassadors. Roosevelt concluded: "I trust that the relations now established between our peoples may forever remain normal and friendly, and that our nations henceforth may cooperate for their mutual benefit and for the preservation of the peace of the world." This is plainly a declaration of desire for peaceful coexistence. In his conclusion Litvinov, saying "I, too, share this hope," repeated this declaration word for word.

On the same date President Roosevelt and Commissar Litvinov also exchanged communications designed to reduce tensions between their governments over issues which were producing attitudes against peaceful coexistence. The first of these pledged each to refrain from interfering in any manner in the internal affairs of the other; to prevent persons and organizations under their control from committing acts liable to injure the security of the other, and from producing propaganda aiming to bring about by force a change in the political or social order of the other; not to permit formation or residence of any organizations or groups claiming to be the government of, or making attempts upon the territorial integrity, or having the aim of armed struggle against the other; not to permit formation or residence of any group having the aim to overthrow or preparation for the overthrow of, or the bringing about by force of a change in the political or social order of the other.

The second of these agreements pledged each to grant to citizens residing in the territory of the other "the same freedom of conscience and religious liberty which they enjoyed at home." The Soviet pledge indicated the law or regulation granting to their own citizens each of the religious rights that President Roosevelt had specified.

The third agreement mutually pledged each government to grant the citizens of the other the same rights to legal protection enjoyed by "the nationals of the nation most favored in this respect." In addition there was an exchange of communications concerning the claims and counter-claims of the respective govern-

ments arising out of the revolution, the civil war and the intervention. This was followed by a joint statement:

In addition to the agreements which we have signed today there has taken place an exchange of views with regard to methods of settling all outstanding questions of indebtedness and claims that permits us to hope for speedy and satisfactory solution of these questions which both our governments desire to have out of the way as soon as possible. Mr. Litvinov will remain in Washington for several days for further discussion.

This hope was never realized. The negotiations were broken off in 1934. No reason was ever given.

Soviet Disarmament Proposals

While economic pressure in the 'twenties was bringing about relationships between the US and the USSR more favorable to peaceful coexistence, the Soviet Union was continuously making proposals for the disarmament necessary for the realization of that kind of living together. At the Geneva Conference of 1922, called by Great Britain, Foreign Commissar Chicherin proposed general reduction of armaments, prohibition of gas warfare and air bombing and banning of weapons aimed at civilian populations. In 1925 the USSR signed the Geneva protocol against bacteriological, gas and chemical warfare, along with all other nations except Japan and the United States.

In April of 1927, at an International Economic Conference held in Geneva, the Soviet delegation urged recognition of the possibility of peaceful coexistence of different economic systems. In November, at the same place, Litvinov submitted to the Preparatory Commission for the Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations a plan for complete disarmament, under international supervision. It was not even discussed. Soviet delegates came back again in March, 1928, with a plan for partial disarmament. They also proposed the prohibition of gas and chemical warfare and air bombings.

The next April (1929) to the same body Litvinov, for the Soviet delegation, again offered a proposal for one hundred per cent disarmament. He also urged that the protocol to this effect signed in 1925 be made effective. Since both these proposals were rejected, in November 1930 Litvinov again called for gradual disarmament. In February, 1932, he submitted to the Disarmament Conference of the League of Nations, a proposal for "the general,

complete and rapid abolition of all armed forces — on the principle of equality for all” as “the only effective means of contribution to the organization of peace and the establishment of security against war.” No agreement was reached on these proposals.

In June the Soviet delegation came back once more with their modified proposal for 50 per cent disarmament. They found the United States had brought the “Hoover plan” for one-third reduction of arms, abolition of bombing planes, and outlawing of gas and chemical warfare. So they dropped their offer and accepted the U.S. plan, only to find the United States against its own proposal when the vote was taken.

This record shows that through the 'twenties and 'thirties the Soviet Union sought continuously to implement the declaration of Stalin after the death of Lenin, at the 1925 Congress of The Communist Party — “underlying our foreign policy is the idea of peace.” This means peace in the larger sense of ending war forever, for all peoples the world around. Soviet leaders, true to a basic principle of Marxist philosophy, never announce goals in terms of ideas and ideals alone. They always specify the concrete steps that have to be taken to realize the concepts and values professed.

The interpretation of Soviet policy by our government completely ignored this record, just as it ignored the basic fact that the positions taken are compelled by self interest as well as called for by universal need. If, in the 'twenties, our government had taken Soviet words at their face value and said “We agree; now let's sit down and work out the necessary controls and offer a complete plan to the world,” there need not have been any cold war today nor any threat of death-spreading bombs. The check on armies, navies and airforces was easy and nuclear research would have been only for peaceful purposes.

III.

Between Recognition and World War II

IN THE FIRST YEARS after the establishment of diplomatic ties developments towards peaceful coexistence made a strong growth.

Areas of Peaceful Coexistence

Despite an early check over the claims and counter-claims arising out of our intervention in the civil war, economic relations increased. Negotiations continued throughout 1934 and ended with agreement to disagree, apparently over the credits or loans to be made by us in return for the waiving of the Soviet claims. Then the Johnson Act, passed in 1934, prohibiting credits to countries in default on their debts, was interpreted to cover the USSR and thus the Export-Import Bank set up a few months before to help American-Soviet commerce, could not act.

Beginning in 1935 a trade agreement was negotiated and renewed each year in which the Soviet Union guaranteed to buy specified amounts of our goods in return for tariff concessions granted under reciprocal trade agreements. After 1937 the USSR received most-favored-nation treatment, but lack of credit facilities was still a brake. Another was added by the Finnish war. The U.S. applied three "moral embargoes" to the Soviet Union—on airplanes, materials for the manufacture of airplanes, and technical equipment for refining high-test gasoline. Nevertheless, the over-all picture shows a steady growth of economic intercourse.

Besides the pull of economic need, the other main pressure for peaceful coexistence is the common need for cultural exchange—in science, art, literature, music and educational methods. This exchange got its initial development soon after recognition. In 1935 the Psychologists Congress in Moscow, and again the Geological Congress in 1937, gave American scientists the opportunity to

observe developments in those fields in the Soviet Union and to interchange views with their fellow workers there. On account of the geographical contact between Alaska and Siberia the meteorological services of the USA and the USSR were drawn into mutual aid. There were exchange visits between exploring research groups in the Antarctic and two way rescues of trans-Polar flyers.

The works of current Soviet composers began to be known by us, and exhibitions of Soviet artists appeared at Philadelphia in 1934 and New York in 1936. Some Soviet writers began to be widely read here and some American writers still more widely read in the Soviet Union. The Pushkin Centenary in 1937 was extensively celebrated both by publication of works and lectures, and by readings and exhibits in a number of cities. The beautiful Soviet Pavilion at the World's Fair in New York, 1938-39, made the people and life of the Soviet Union known to millions of our citizens. The beginning of departments of Russian studies appeared in our universities.

People to people contacts were further extended by tourism. Their reports, the brilliant reporting of *New York Times* correspondent Walter Duranty, an increasing number of objective and favorable books, again offset to some extent the never-ending flood of hostile propaganda, which continued its poisonous work.

Soviet Anti-Fascist Effort

These gains were overshadowed by the rise of Nazism in Germany and the growing threat of aggression, from the anti-Comintern axis of Germany, Italy and Japan. Realizing that this menace required concerted action the Soviet Union pursued a policy of seeking collective security pacts, joint action against aggressors, and aid to their victims.

President Roosevelt also saw the need for collective action against the fascist menace. In his Chicago speech in 1937 he called for the quarantining of the aggressors. But, faced with an isolationist bloc in Congress, and, both here and in England, in France and Rome, by those who hoped that fascist aggression could be turned against the USSR, and that both fascism and communism would be destroyed in the process, he got nowhere. So in 1938 there came the Munich Pact in which British Prime Minister Neville Chamberlain and French Foreign Minister Edouard Daladier, signing with dictators Hitler and Mussolini, sacrificed Czechoslovakia in the

mistaken hope of turning Axis aggression to the East and saving their own skins.

Even after this revealing act the Soviet Union continued its efforts for collective security. It carried on fruitless negotiations with British and French diplomatic and, later, military representatives. Only when the British and French demonstrated beyond doubt that they did not intend to join in collective defense against Hitler, did the Soviet Union take the fateful step of signing a Non-Aggression Pact with Nazi Germany on August 23, 1939. The mere act of signing an agreement with Hitler turned many friends of the Soviet Union, including Communists, who failed to understand the pact's purpose and consequences, against the USSR. Later our cold war leaders used this pact as the source of a flood of false anti-Soviet propaganda.

The Soviet-German Non-Aggression Pact

At the peak of this flood was a State Department publication concerning the Hitler-Soviet non-aggression pact which will be dealt with later. The Soviet government answered this with a publication called "Falsifiers of History" wherein it states that the reason it decided "in its self defense to accept Germany's proposal for a pact of Non-Aggression" was to

... thereby assure the Soviet Union of prolongation of peace for a certain period, which might be used to prepare the forces of the Soviet State for resistance to eventual aggression.

The statement points out that for years the Soviet Union had tried to get a collective security agreement to stop Hitler's aggression. It adds that during the post Munich pact negotiations, Britain and France tried to bind the Soviet Union to defend the border states while leaving themselves free to decide whether so to act. It further claims that at the same time Britain was carrying on confidential political and economic negotiations with Hitler which, like Munich, would leave him free to attack Poland and the Soviet Union. Its leaders decided they were left isolated and had no choice but to accept Hitler's offer of a non-aggression pact.

Two authoritative writers on the diplomacy of this period, Professor Frederick L. Schuman and Professor William Appleman Williams, conclude that all the evidence supports the Soviet assertions, and decision.

In his introduction to an American edition of "Falsifiers of History" Professor Schuman wrote:

The then leaders of the Western Powers, having been offered a new opportunity to build a great coalition against Axis aggression, treated it as they had earlier treated Soviet efforts to establish an effective system of collective security—and for the same reason. The men of Moscow drew the only conclusion that rational rulers, seriously concerned with the best interests of their people could possibly draw.

His judgment is:

The USSR alone among the non-Fascist powers, strove through weary and tragic years to prevent war by halting Fascist aggression in time through concerted action, while France, Britain and (for somewhat different reasons) America made war inevitable by encouraging Fascist aggression in the hope that the USSR would be the main target.

Professor Williams, in his book *American-Soviet Relations, 1781-1947* agrees that the Soviet Union was completely isolated. He adds that, from the record of our behavior which he cites:

Russia had no reason to anticipate any meaningful collaboration with the United States, against either Japan or Hitler, in the foreseeable future.

He quotes a remark of Stalin during conversations with Latvia about mutual defense arrangements against Hitler in October, 1939, only two months after the non-aggression pact:

But one cannot rely upon it. We must be prepared in time. Others who were not ready paid the price.

The War with Finland

The Soviet Union proceeded at once to get ready—its main objective in signing the pact. It began by laying the foundation for a defensive Western front. It pushed its troops across the pre-war Soviet-Polish border, occupied Western Byelorussia and Western Ukraine. Concerning this action Winston Churchill, in a radio speech on October 1, 1939, following some unfriendly remarks about the Soviet Union, declared:

That the Russian armies should stand on this line was clearly necessary for the safety of Russia against the Nazi menace. [At a later point he declared that this move was in the interest of the Allies themselves.]

The Soviet Union also began to build defenses along the "Curzon line" established for Russia by the Versailles Conference. It signed

mutual assistance pacts with Estonia, Latvia and Lithuania, establishing garrisons, airfields and naval bases. The attempt to repeat this procedure at the Northern frontier failed and the Finnish war resulted.

In *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia*, Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn show why.

The Finnish military leader, Baron Karl Gustav von Mannerheim was in close and constant communication with the German High Command. There were frequent joint staff talks and German officers periodically supervised Finnish army maneuvers. . . . With the aid of German officers and engineers, Finland had been converted into a powerful fortress to serve as a base for the invasion of the Soviet Union. Twenty-three military airports had been constructed on Finnish soil, capable of accommodating ten times as many airplanes as there were in the Finnish air force. Nazi technicians had supervised the construction of the Mannerheim line, a series of intricate, splendidly equipped fortifications running several miles deep along the Soviet border and having heavy guns at one point only twenty-one miles from Leningrad. . . .

Consequently the Finnish government refused the Soviet proposal of a mutual assistance pact just as in the spring of 1938, more than a year before the Nazi-Soviet non-aggression pact, they had refused mutual security arrangements in view of the possibility that Germany would begin a war against Russia. They refused also a Soviet proposal to shift back the Finnish border on the Karelian Isthmus about 21 miles from Leningrad and take an area twice as large in Soviet Karelia as compensation. For thus continuing the menace to Leningrad, for "provocative actions on the Soviet-Finnish border" the Soviet government charged the Finnish government with causing the war.

In his report to the Supreme Soviet on the settlement of the Finnish war, March 29, 1940, V. M. Molotov, then Soviet Foreign Minister, said that the Soviet Union:

. . . having had every opportunity of occupying the whole of Finland did not do so and did not demand any indemnities for its war expenditure as any other power would have done, but confined its demands to a minimum. . . . We pursued no other object in the Peace Treaty than that of safeguarding the security of Leningrad, Murmansk and the Murmansk railway.

Detailing the military consequences that would have followed in World War II if the Soviet Union had not used the time gained by the non-aggression pact to establish a defensive front, the Soviet

statement in "Falsifiers of History" concludes that the result would have been that the war would have lasted two years more.

Some revealing actions followed the Finnish war. The British and French got the League of Nations to declare the Soviet Union an aggressor in Finland. They then supplied the Finnish army with weapons and munitions. Chamberlain stated in the House of Commons that the British also had prepared an expeditionary force of 100,000 men to fight against the Soviet Union in Finland. It didn't get there because Sweden and Norway refused passage. The Soviets quote a Swedish White Paper which said:

... the dispatch of this force is part of the general plan of an attack upon the Soviet Union . . . beginning March 15, this plan will be put into effect against Baku [again the oil] and still earlier through Finland.

How many in this country who believed, and may still believe, the Soviet Union an aggressor in Finland ever heard of these plans? Concerning them, Professor Schuman wrote in the above mentioned introduction to "Falsifiers of History", as follows:

Daladier, Weygand, Gamelin and Darlan made plans in January, 1940, to attack Baku and the Soviet oil fields from Turkey. On February 5, the Allied Supreme War Council resolved to send troops to Finland to fight the Red Army, then battling the forces of Baron Mannerheim after Helsinki's refusal to accept Soviet terms for an exchange of territories and a mutual aid pact. Early in March, London asked Stockholm and Oslo to permit passage of Allied troops to wage war on Russia. They refused. An expedition of 100,000 men was assembled for the purpose. Despite the Finnish-Soviet peace of March 12, the French and British General staffs continued to make plans for an attack on Soviet Trans-Caucasia, to be launched in the summer — by which time, as it turned out, France was conquered by the Wehrmacht. Later revelations indicate that Weygand and De Gaulle, prior to the French debacle, drew up a plan to take Leningrad via Finland, bomb Baku and Batum, occupy the Caucasus, and invade the USSR from the South.

Undoubtedly, the memory of this incident, added to that of the intervention against the Soviet Republic in its early years, has been one source of the suspicions displayed by the Soviet leaders in negotiations with the Western allies.

The State Department's Use of Nazi Documents

Far greater, however, than the influence of these two events upon subsequent relationships between the United States and the

Soviet Union is the use of the Hitler-Soviet non-aggression pact by those who intend if they can to continue the cold war as the substitute for peaceful coexistence. Undoubtedly most of those who have heard of it now believe that pact was a deal between Hitler and Stalin to divide Eastern Europe; also that it was the direct cause of World War II.

For these beliefs our government was directly responsible by releasing in January, 1948, the second year of the cold war, the publication *Nazi-Soviet Relations, 1939-1941*. It contained "260 documents in 357 pages", taken from German archives. The general treatment of its contents by the press is shown by the main headlines of two New York papers. *The New York Times*: "SEIZED NAZI PAPERS SHOW SOVIET AIMS IN 1939 TO GRAB LAND AND DIVIDE EUROPE." *The New York Herald-Tribune*: "U.S. REVEALS DOCUMENTS OF A STALIN-HITLER PACT TO DIVIDE UP THE WORLD."

Only the few people who knew the diplomatic history of the period were in a position to tell the truth. Vera M. Dean wrote in the *Foreign Policy Bulletin*, January 30, 1948:

Publication of the Nazi-Soviet documents without any attempt to give the context of other events of the inter-war years gives a distorted picture.

In *Propaganda that Backfired*, February 12 of that year, Walter Lippman said:

That the State Department book was the work of propagandists and not of scholars is self-evident on the face of it. It contained only Nazi documents, and no self-respecting historian would dream of basing his judgment on the documents of only one side of a grave historical event.

On this point Professor Schuman's introduction to "Falsifiers of History" says:

All documents essential to an understanding of German-Soviet relations in 1939-1941 [the editor's claim] would, of necessity, include papers on Anglo-German and Franco-German relations during the same period and earlier. Virtually all such material has here been suppressed in order to present a wholly misleading account, not only derived exclusively from Nazi sources but from those particular Nazi sources best calculated to promote fear and hatred of the USSR. . . . The net result is the most astounding travesty of truth that has ever been perpetrated in this field since the falsifications of the French Yellow Book and the [Tsarist] Russian Orange Book of 1914.

Concerning the "Secret Protocol" which Professor Schuman calls "the State Department's prize exhibit" he commented:

The American press have presented it as a robbers' pact whereby Hitler gave Stalin Finland, Estonia, Latvia, Eastern Poland and Besarabia, while Stalin gave Hitler Lithuania and Western Poland. In fact, the document merely says that "In the event of a territorial and political rearrangement" the German and Soviet spheres of influence "shall be bounded by the frontier of Lithuania and by the rivers Narew, Vistula and San." [Modified slightly in a later document].

The inferences, nowhere stated or implied in the documents, but dramatized a thousand times in horror stricken tones by sundry anti-Soviet publicists, are that Moscow "plotted" with Berlin to partition Poland: that the USSR eagerly joined in the plunder; and that the Soviet Union thus precipitated World War II by making itself Hitler's partner in crime.

No greater misrepresentation of the established facts in the case is imaginable. . . . The Nazi decision to strike down Poland was reached months before the Nazi-Soviet Pact. . . . [Corroborating documents are cited].

The State Department publication further charged that captured documents show that during Molotov's visit to Berlin in 1940 plans were discussed and agreed upon with Hitler for the partition of Europe, Soviet expansion southward, and its relations with Turkey, Iran and Bulgaria. The Soviet reply says that Molotov's visit was merely a courtesy return for Ribbentrop's two trips to Moscow, that Hitler tried to discuss the basis for a broad Nazi-Soviet agreement; that the Soviet Government then used the opportunity to probe his intentions "without having any intentions of concluding an agreement of any kind with the Germans." Having drawn certain useful conclusions, the Soviets never resumed the talks, despite Ribbentrop's repeated reminders.

Professor Schuman comments:

Nazi preparations to invade Russia were begun before and not after Molotov's visit to Berlin. . . . The truth about Nazi designs against the Soviet Union, like the truth about Nazi designs against Poland, could have been revealed only by publishing material from the Wehrmacht archives, not from the foreign office archives. Only one Wehrmacht document appears in the publication; the directive of Dec. 18, pp. 260-264. But at Nuremberg, (in case the State Department has forgotten) excerpts from Wehrmacht documents were used to convict the war criminals. They show unmistakably that secret preparations to attack the USSR were initiated in August 1940. . . . [Quotations cited.]

More Nazi documents, taken from Berlin archives, confirm both the Soviet position and Professor Schuman's findings. Con-

cerning the earlier promise of such material, however, Professor Schuman wrote:

In fact, new archive material, albeit always welcome to scholars, is quite unnecessary to demonstrate the mendacity of the State Department fairy-story. All that is needed is a re-reading of various publications of 1939: The French Yellow Book the Polish White Book, the British War Blue Book, the German White Book No. 2 Failure of a Mission, by Neville Henderson and the Nuremberg documents of 1946. The actual pattern of world politics during the fateful years preceding World War II was discernible even before these earlier documents appeared.

The tragedy in the part being played by the Hitler-Soviet Non-Aggression Pact in shaping US-USSR relationships is that, after it had shortened the war and saved millions of lives, it was falsely used by our government to gain support for the cold war, stop the growing American-Soviet friendship, and risk the boundless disaster of World War III.

It is still being so used by all who are opposed to peaceful coexistence.

IV.

During World War II

IN THE EARLY DAYS of World War II both the United States and the USSR were officially neutral, in differing ways and for different reasons. Our sympathy was with England and we gave such aid as official neutrality permitted. Soviet sympathy was not with Hitler but they were officially tied by the non-aggression pact, and acted as that required.

Allies Against Hitler

The unprovoked and unheralded invasion launched by Hitler against the Soviet Union on June 22, 1941, in gross violation of the non-aggression pact, brought about an immediate change in American-Soviet relations. The anti-fascist temper of the American people was demonstrated in wide support for the Russians. The press to a large extent changed its hostile tone.

President Roosevelt, overruling those who hoped to see the Soviets exhaust themselves in the struggle along with those who thought they could not last, decided to give all possible economic assistance to the USSR and sent Harry Hopkins to Moscow to work out the details. Soviet credits were unfrozen, the ban on export licenses was lifted, application of the Neutrality Act was waived to allow delivery of war materials to Moscow, and a version of the Lend-Lease Act was pushed through, against the opposition of a faction of the State Department and the isolationists inside and outside of Congress, which allowed the President to give aid to the USSR when the need arose.

Those were the days when our Army Intelligence was expecting Hitler to take Moscow in one to three months; the *New York Times'* military expert was proclaiming that the Russians were no match for the Germans "in staff work and leadership, in training and equipment"; the *New York Journal-American* was gleefully

yelling "Russia is doomed." Joining in the chorus was Congressman Martin Dies, Chairman of the Un-American Activities Committee, with "Hitler will be in control of Russia in thirty days"; Harry S. Truman (then U.S. Senator), with his "wait and let them destroy each other."

It was not until November 7th, 1941, that Roosevelt felt U.S. public opinion ripe for the formal inclusion of the Soviet Union in Lend-Lease aid. This step he took with the words "I have today found that the defense of the USSR is vital to the defense of the United States."

After we entered the war Roosevelt was very careful to see that complete reciprocity was observed. Secretary of State Hull always informed Moscow of any action he was going to take. He has recorded that Stalin always responded in kind. Secretary of War Stimson wrote: "The Russians were magnificent allies. They fought as they promised and they made no separate peace." General Eisenhower put on record that after January, 1945, whenever it became necessary he was kept "fully informed at all times of the essentials of the Red Army's plans."

Growing Friendship and Cooperation

A growing knowledge of the extent of the contribution the Soviet Union was making to the winning of the war naturally developed the spirit of friendship in this nation toward the Soviet peoples. This was brought to a high peak by the heroic defense and pivotal victory of Stalingrad, an epic in the long story of human courage and fortitude.

Meanwhile, moved by this knowledge, and the kindred awareness of the consequent vast losses, all across the country individuals and groups began collecting medical and other supplies, clothing and food, for the peoples of the Soviet Union. Out of the need to coordinate this work a nationwide organization, Russian War Relief, was established, with branches in every large city and thousands of smaller towns. Top government officials sponsored its work, carried on under the chairmanship of Edward C. Carter. Special days or weeks for "Aid to Russia" were proclaimed in many cities and communities. All through the war years this organization continued to enlist the widest support from every section of the American people. Many millions of dollars were raised, many large shipments of supplies were sent.

The extent of the goodwill and friendliness growing among us for our Russian Allies was further revealed by a Congress of American-Soviet Friendship held on November 7-8, 1942, in New York City to celebrate the twenty-fifth anniversary of the establishment of the Soviet Republic. As the Foreword to its report correctly says:

It demonstrated the extent to which the American people as a whole are becoming aware not only of our immeasurable debt to the Soviet people of today, but of the great contributions of the Soviet Union to civilization and progress. It did far more than that. It emphasized the similarities between our two countries rather than the differences which our enemies have played upon in their attempts to divide the United Nations. It made clear that our alliance with Russia is no accident, but a natural result of common interests and aims in the spheres of democracy and national affairs. In so doing the Congress served to strengthen the friendship between our two countries, not only for the duration of the war against the Axis, but for the important postwar period when we must work together to build a secure and peaceful world....

Joseph E. Davies, former Ambassador to the Soviet Union, became Honorary Chairman of the Congress of American-Soviet Friendship and the long list of sponsors, headed by Secretary of State Hull, included government officials and public figures from every section of the country. The 1,200 odd delegates and the 20,000 who jammed Madison Square Garden for the closing "Salute to Our Russian Ally", represented a cross-section of the nation and all its interests. Leaders of religion, labor, business, education, science, the arts, women, Negroes, youth, and government joined in the tributes to the Soviet Union and the desire for cooperation.

In addition to a message of support from President Roosevelt, the Administration participated in this Salute through the speech of Vice-President Henry A. Wallace, in which he declared:

From north, south, east and west, Americans have come this day to pay tribute to our Russian ally. It is right that we should do so, because the Russians have so far lost in the common cause of the United Nations at least fifty per cent more men killed, wounded and missing than all the rest of the European Allies put together. Moreover, they have killed, wounded and captured at least twenty times as many Germans as have the rest of the Allies.... The American people are solidly behind President Roosevelt in his decision to give Russia priority number one.

Here are a few of the expressions of other speakers:

Hon. Joseph E. Davies:

... Without the Soviet Union we cannot hope to build the peace of the world. Therefore we must understand each other — therefore America and Russia must be friends.

Hon. Herbert H. Lehman, then Governor of New York:

I am proud to be here to honor the friendship of the two peoples, who are joined with the United Nations in the determination to establish such brotherhood and peace in the world.

Thomas W. Lamont, Chairman of the Executive Committee,
J. P. Morgan Co.:

... Without Russia as our friend in the postwar years, never will a man or woman in this audience see a peaceful or a stable world.

Corliss Lamont, Chairman of the Congress, presented to the Soviet Ambassador a four volume Book of American Friendship, signed by tens of thousands of Americans, whose signatures were collected by the American Council on Soviet Relations, expressing their conviction "that the bonds between the United States and the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics are and shall be the bonds that exist between friends."

In his reply Ambassador Maxim M. Litvinov said:

Friendship between the USSR and the USA, based upon complete mutual understanding, confidence and respect, should occupy a conspicuous place in the system of United Nations cooperation — cooperation dictated by the common interests in bringing the war to a victorious end, and quite essential for the solution of the vast problems bound to arise after the war.

Panel sessions held during the Congress, with the participation of leading experts, covered such subjects as science and exploration, public health and medicine, women and child care, the arts, production and the role of the trade unions. While related to wartime needs, the reports and discussions contributed a wide perspective of all the two countries have to give each other in cultural, scientific and human interchange.

As a result of this Congress, and similar tributes of friendship to the peoples of the Soviet Union in other cities, steps were taken to coordinate the work of the various groups engaged in these activities. On February 3, 1943, the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship was formed.

The following autumn, commemorating the tenth anniversary of the establishment of American-Soviet diplomatic relations, this organization held another Congress in New York City—November

6-8. Here are some extracts from the speeches showing that the spirit of friendship between the USA and the USSR was gaining in strength. They also expressed the national reaction to the Moscow pact of that year agreed to by the foreign ministers of the United States, Great Britain, the Soviet Union and China. It specified their joint behavior in the war and postwar world. The Congress, in every session, voted to support and implement these agreements.

Almost all departments of our government took some part in the discussions:

Hon. Henry W. Morgenthau, Jr., Secretary of the Treasury:

Everyone coming out of Russia after close association with the Russian people spoke highly of their character and integrity. Over and over again, I heard this: "They stand by their word. What they agree to do they do, they'll do . . . and nothing will stop them. There is no hedging, and no deviation from any commitment they make, no matter how inconvenient or difficult carrying out their word may seem to be when the time comes to deliver the goods."

Hon. Harold L. Ickes, Secretary of the Interior:

For my part, I believe there is enough good will and wisdom in both countries to help to build a bridge of permanent peace that will securely span the narrow waters that separate our mighty republics.

Hon. Edward R. Stettinius, Jr., Under-Secretary of State:

The joint sacrifices and military efforts made during the war assure a victory and further emphasize our determination to do all in our power to enlarge and continue this cooperation in bringing to the world an era of peace based on justice and mutual respect for all freedom-loving people.

Hon. Donald M. Nelson, Chairman, War Production Board:

The Russians whom I met understand the meaning of a square deal and a firm agreement. I recognize good faith when I see it. At one point in my conversation with Mr. Stalin he said to me: "Any obligation undertaken by this government will be repaid in full — not by token payments." . . . I am convinced that we Americans, who are a businesslike people, will find sound men with whom to do business in that vast, powerful, and developing country.

Panel sessions at this Congress resulted in the organization through the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship of specialized committees, of professionals for US-USSR scientific and cultural interchange which carried on important two-way exchanges of information and exhibits until the cold war that followed the

wartime alliance and the period of McCarthy hysteria, labelled such activities "subversive." That ended them. Nevertheless, they laid an important foundation for the official US-USSR cultural interchange agreement of 1958.

Hostile Forces Also Operate

While the spirit of friendship and the desire for cooperation was thus being developed by the joint war effort, opposition to this course, later to inaugurate and direct the cold war as the substitute for peaceful coexistence, was also operating. One of the main goals of the National Council of American-Soviet Friendship at the time was to help the American people to understand and express themselves against, "powerful elements who were endangering the whole course of the war by their opposition to the Roosevelt policy of 'the closest possible cooperation with our Soviet ally'."

This opposition, and its activities, is described in detail in *The Great Conspiracy Against Russia* by Michael Sayers and Albert E. Kahn:

At the time of America's entry into the Second World War, scores of American fascist organizations describing themselves as "anti-Communist" were active throughout the United States. . . . In the name of saving America from Communism . . . [their] publications called for the overthrow of the Government of the United States, the establishment of an American fascist regime, and an alliance with the Axis against Soviet Russia.

In a different way a small, but widely read, section of the regular press was creating ill will toward the Soviet Union throughout the war. At the 1943 Congress of American-Soviet Friendship, Secretary of the Interior Ickes declared:

Unfortunately there are powerful and active forces in this country that are deliberately fostering ill will toward Russia. There are those who hate Premier Stalin and President Roosevelt so bitterly that they would rather see Hitler win the war, if the alternative be his defeat by a leadership shared in by the great Russia and the great America. Need I name names? Let me simply mention, as an example, the Hearst press and the Patterson-McCormick newspaper axis, particularly the latter.

On April 28, 1942, President Roosevelt warned the nation that the war effort—

. . . must not be impeded by a few bogus patriots who use the sacred freedom of the press to echo the sentiments of the propagandists in Tokyo and Berlin.

Concerning the anti-Soviet faction in the State Department and the armed services, he said he sometimes wondered whether they wouldn't rather fight Russia than Hitler. In the fall of 1944, when Nazi Germany faced defeat from the combined offensive of the Allies, William C. Bullitt, former Ambassador to Moscow and Paris, called for a new anti-Soviet alliance to save Western civilization from the menace of "Soviet imperialism."

The campaign against the Soviet Union did not lack support in Congress from former isolationists and America Firsters. The most outspoken was Martin Dies, first Chairman of the House Un-American Activities Committee.

Dies' first chief investigator, Edward F. Sullivan, was a former labor spy and anti-Soviet propagandist. He had been associated with an anti-Soviet Ukrainian movement which took its directives from other White Ukrainian émigrés in Berlin. After he was a main speaker at a national anti-Semitic and pro-Nazi conference at Asheville, North Carolina, and the Asheville press said his speech was "what Hitler would have said had he been speaking," Dies had to drop him.

But Dies himself kept on at intervals discovering fifth columns operating under "directions from Moscow." In a letter to President Roosevelt, October 2, 1941, Dies declared:

I intend, Mr. President, to seize every opportunity to let the American people know that the similarities between Stalin and Hitler are more striking than their differences.

This he continued to do after the United States and the Soviet Union became military allies.

The opposition to friendship with our allies did not injure relations between us and the Soviet peoples as much as did the questions created in the minds of the Soviet leaders by our delaying response to their statement of postwar needs. They insisted they must have frontiers that would enable them to meet any other attack—this meant the defense border they set up in 1940; and they must have economic aid to restore their devastated land—this meant loans and adequate reparations. To these were added a more immediate need—a second front.

On the first two of these we stalled. Roosevelt wanted to preserve postwar freedom of action and Secretary of State Hull did not want to negotiate before the war was over.

The Second Front Delay

The Second Front delay caused resentment in the USSR for over two years. It was in June, 1942, that Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov put the question bluntly in Washington: "Could we undertake such action as would draw off forty German divisions?" General Marshall answered "Yes." Roosevelt thereupon authorized Molotov to inform Stalin that we expected the formation of a Second Front that year. The official communiqué said "full understanding was reached." To Moscow this meant but one thing: a major assault upon Hitler's Europe.

But Prime Minister Churchill, without whose cooperation there could be no crossing of the Channel, said he wasn't ready and had to go and tell Stalin so in person. So when the North African invasion occurred, with nothing done in Europe, Moscow felt there had been bad faith. This strain was not removed until all these issues were ironed out at the Teheran Conference which opened November 28, 1943, where Roosevelt, Stalin and Churchill reached "complete agreement as to the scope and timing of operations which will be undertaken." The Second Front in Europe was finally opened June 6, 1944, with the landing on Normandy by the American and British forces.

There is a postscript to this record which those who had an uneasy conscience about the Second Front do not like to remember. Towards the end of December, 1944, when most people thought it was no longer possible, the Nazis launched a formidable offensive in the Ardennes, broke through the front and placed many of the American and British troops in Belgium in a difficult and even dangerous position. Churchill, on behalf of General Eisenhower, sent a message to Stalin saying:

I shall be grateful if you can tell me whether we can count on a major Russian offensive on the Vistula front, or elsewhere, during January, with any other points you may care to mention.

Stalin replied immediately that they had been preparing an offensive but were waiting for weather favorable to their artillery and air force, but that in view of the position of our Allies on the Western front:

Headquarters of the Supreme Command has decided to complete the preparations at a forced pace and, disregarding the weather, to launch wide-scale offensive operations against the Germans all along the Central Front not later than the second half of January...

Three days after that answer, on a three thousand mile front, from the Baltic Sea to the Carpathians, 150 Soviet divisions broke through the German front and threw the German troops back many miles. Five or six days later German troops on the Western front, among them the 5th and 6th Panzer Armies, had to be transferred to the East to meet the attacking Soviet troops. The German offensive in the West was thus frustrated. Expressing on behalf of His Majesty's Government heartfelt thanks and congratulations. Churchill quoted a Soviet Order of the Day which said the consequences of their move were that it:

Thwarted the German's winter offensive in the West, which aimed at the seizure of Belgium and Alsace, and enabled the armies of our Allies in their turn to launch an offensive against the Germans...

Teheran and Yalta

In his message to Congress of January 11, 1944, Roosevelt made it plain that the Teheran Conference had settled his mind about the postwar relations between the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain. The Declaration of the Three-Power Agreement there arrived at began with:

We express our determination that our nations shall work together in the war and the peace that will follow... We came here with hope and determination. We leave here friends in fact, in spirit, and in purpose.

In reviewing that spirit and purpose to Congress, Roosevelt said:

The one supreme objective for the future, which we discussed for each nation individually, and for all the United Nations, can be summed up in one word: Security; [But not as an end; security as the means to what all three leaders made "abundantly clear" was their basic war aim] the resumption of peaceful progress by their own peoples—progress toward a better life.

It was this emphasis on security, plus Roosevelt's declaration that the Big Three would settle that issue, which paved the way for the agreements reached, and the compromises accepted, at the Yalta Conference which opened February 4, 1945. There was a firm agreement for a United Nations Organization including the time and place for starting it. There was a pledge of the Soviet Government to enter the war against Japan three months after V-E day, May 6, 1945. (The Soviet army marched against Japan August 6, 1945.) There was agreement, through compromise, on Soviet

western frontiers and the Polish government, (the Curzon line was adopted), on German reparations and liberated areas. These agreements, to be so bitterly attacked later, received an enthusiastic approval in the Senate. Majority Leader Barkley cabled:

Sincere felicitations on the historic Joint Statement released to-day. I had it read to the Senate immediately upon release and it made a profound impression. Senator White, minority leaders, joined me in the expressions of commendation and satisfaction on the floor of the Senate. I regard it as one of the most important steps ever taken to promote peace and happiness in the world.

At the conference Stalin had warned:

It is not so difficult to keep unity in time of war since there is a joint aim to defeat the common enemy which is clear to every one. The difficult task will come after the war when diverse interests tend to divide the Allies. It is our duty to see that our relations in peacetime are as strong as they have been in war.

While the Yalta decisions were being implemented, Roosevelt died. Within a few days the enemies of his foreign policy in both parties were getting together to reverse it. They launched a major attack against Yalta. Then, and since, they have continuously charged the Soviet Union with violating its provisions regarding frontiers and the kind of government to be set up in Poland. Article VII specified that the:

.... Provisional Government which is now functioning in Poland should therefore be reorganized on a broader democratic basis with the inclusion of democratic leaders from Poland itself and from Poles abroad.

To Moscow, "reorganized" meant the expansion of the government then in existence; to London and Washington it meant an entirely new government. It is agreed, however, that all parties meant a government friendly to Moscow. Thus the issue was part of the need for a defensible border. The break came over the number to be included from the government-in-exile in London, and their position on the Curzon line.

Stalin was demanding that persons picked by Washington and London must accept the Curzon line and give evidence of "really striving to establish friendly relations between Poland and the Soviet Union." The tension on this matter was increased by a Red Army entrance into Rumania while the main offensive against Berlin was on. Soviet Ambassador Andrei Gromyko explained to Secretary Hull that this was "the beginning of a full-reestablish-

ment of the border delineated in 1940" and gave assurance that no further extensions were planned.

Beside the Teheran-Yalta recognition of Soviet need for security, Roosevelt was also confronted with a Churchill-Stalin agreement which gave the Soviet Union dominance in Rumania, Bulgaria and Hungary in return for joint authority in Yugoslavia and British dominance in Greece. Furthermore, the British had used this authority between 1944 and Yalta to defeat the Communist-led campaign against the Greek Monarchists, and Churchill had advised Roosevelt that:

Stalin adhered very strictly to this understanding during the thirty days' fighting against the Communists and ELAS in the city of Athens, in spite of the fact that all this was most disagreeable to him and those around him.

It was these developments concerning Poland and Rumania that Roosevelt, an hour before he died, was writing Churchill about in relation to a speech he was to make in the Parliament:

I would minimize the general Soviet problem as much as possible because these problems, in one form or another, seem to arise every day and most of them straighten out as in the case of the Bern meeting. We must be firm, however, and our course thus far is correct.

The opponents of the Roosevelt policy have gone so far in their distortion of the record as to imply that "our course" meant that Roosevelt had changed to the one they were pursuing. Ex-Secretary of State, James F. Byrnes, so implied in his book *Speaking Frankly*. On this Professor Schuman, in a review of the book, commented:

Mr. Byrnes disproves his own point because he does not understand the course. Franklin D. Roosevelt's course was to treat the Soviet Union as an equal, to minimize frictions, and to adjust differences by discussion and compromise. . . .

That is the traditional method of peace-seeking diplomacy, adjusted to the new fact of the necessity for peaceful coexistence of two differing economic and political systems. That course leads us to the task to which Roosevelt called us in his last written words:

The work my friends, is peace; more than an end of the war, an end of the beginning of all wars.

The course of Roosevelt's opponents led us in the opposite direction—into the cold war and its catastrophic nuclear arms race.

V.

The Cold War

THE COLD WAR is the name given to the change in our foreign policy that took place shortly after the death of President Roosevelt on April 12, 1945. The new policy regarded Russia as enemy instead of possible cooperator; sought surrender to our aims instead of mutually helpful adjustments; relied upon force instead of reason and justice. It made the only available alternative to nuclear war of mutual annihilation — peaceful coexistence — impossible, because its objective was the destruction of the Soviet political and economic system.

The cold war developed gradually. Late in April, 1945, President Harry S. Truman called a group of advisers to the White House to discuss policy toward Russia. Admiral Leahy, who had been with Roosevelt at Yalta, reports in *I Was There* that, with several doubtful voices, the consensus of opinion was:

that the time had arrived to take a strong American attitude toward Russia, and that no particular harm could be done to our war prospects if Russia should slow down her war effort in Europe and Asia.

Get Tough With Russia

Truman, who had pledged himself to fulfill Roosevelt's program for "lasting peace" went over to the "get tough with Russia" group. Details of that meeting as recorded by Secretary of Defense Forrestal in his Diary and by Charles Bohlen of the State Department, show that Truman, much worked up over the Polish question, was warned by both General Marshall and Secretary of War Stimson that it would be a serious matter to risk a break with Russia over an interpretation of the meaning of the Yalta agreement, that it might affect the coming United Nations organizing conference at San Francisco. Bohlen says Truman replied:

. . . . that he felt our agreements with the Soviet Union so far had been a one-way street and that he could not continue; it was

now or never. He intended to go on with the plans for San Francisco and if the Russians did not wish to join us, they could go to hell. . . .

Soviet Foreign Minister Molotov, on his way to the San Francisco Conference to organize the UN, was instructed to stop over in Washington and assure President Truman of Stalin's friendly attitude.

Truman is reported to have charged Molotov with breaking the Yalta agreement and to have used very blunt language. Professor Williams (*American-Russian Relations 1781-1947*) says he told him "that he would, if necessary, form the United Nations Organization of non-Russian states." In his *Speaking Frankly*, former Secretary of State Byrnes said: "It was not a very harmonious meeting and ended rather abruptly." Washington talk was that Molotov — messenger of good-will — had walked out on Truman.

Truman tried later to push the date of his break with Russia up to 1947 the time of the proclamation of the "Truman doctrine," declaring:

I tried for more than two years to reach an understanding with them [the Russians].

But the record shows that Secretary of State Byrnes reflected Truman's "get tough" attitude of April of 1945, when he came to the London Foreign Ministers conference in September 1945.

Further evidence that 1945 was the time when the decisive break in policy was made is the treatment Molotov received at the San Francisco conference over the action admitting pro-Nazi Argentina to UN membership. It had been agreed at Yalta that this should not be done. At San Francisco the U.S. delegation supported the admission.

The situation was made worse by the way it was handled. Molotov did not oppose; he merely asked that "the question of asking Argentina to the conference be postponed for a few days for further study," on the ground that all other invitations had been approved unanimously by the four sponsoring governments. Obviously he wanted to consult his government. Secretary of State Stettinius spoke against the request and the vote was 28 to 7 for our position.

We pled the necessity to support our Latin American friends. But Averell Harriman, former U. S. Ambassador to the Soviet Union, had been holding off-the-record press conferences expressing

the new policy of irreconcilable differences with the Soviet Union. Behind him Senator Vandenberg, of the U. S. delegation, was working, with John Foster Dulles coaching him. A part of the press understood what was being done. In a news story the conservative *New York Herald-Tribune* said that the anti-fascist policy of Ex-Secretary of State Cordell Hull had been "abandoned" and the U. S. had "built a steamroller" against the Soviet Union. Walter Lippmann wrote that Stettinius' action, "to the astonishment and dismay of every experienced observer," pointed toward a UN "dominated by the American Republics with the help of British votes."

Cordell Hull was more specific. He was senior adviser to our delegation but was in a hospital and had not been consulted. When he heard the news he called Stettinius on the phone and told him that "irreparable harm had been done." He added:

I also told him that if the American delegation were not careful we should get Russia into such a state of mind that she might decide that the United Nations organization was not going to furnish adequate security to her in the future.

These words need to be remembered in assessing Soviet policy in the UN.

Immediately after this incident another, which added to Soviet suspicion and fears, occurred outside the San Francisco Conference. On May 12, 1945, Leo T. Crowley, head of Foreign Economic Aid Administration stopped Lend-Lease shipments to the Soviet Union without warning. Truman's defenders claim that this was done without his knowledge. What made it worse was that the Soviet Union was scheduled to join the war against Japan within three months.

The immediate reaction of the Soviet Union to this act of hostility, on top of the anti-Soviet words and deeds at San Francisco, was to insist upon the veto applying to the UN agenda. The purpose was to prevent the UN being used by an Anglo-American majority for propaganda, as the League of Nations had been used, against the Soviet Union. The United States and England insisted that the UN had the right to discuss any question. A deadlock resulted and Molotov went home.

This was less than a month after Roosevelt's death. The majority of the nation was still impressed by the Soviet contribution of winning the war. A strong group in the Cabinet was against

the cold war makers and capable of speaking out. An influential section of the press did speak out. *The Washington Post* called Stettinius and his associates "bush league diplomats." The reactionaries were getting out on a limb. To be charged with causing the attempt at a United Nations to fail would have destroyed their influence. Moscow Ambassador Harriman and Bohlen of the State Department, on a plane together, asked each other if there was any way out. Bohlen suggested that Truman send Harry Hopkins, whom Stalin knew and trusted, to Moscow. Harriman was enthusiastic. Truman consented. Hopkins, although not well, was willing to go because he knew there was a dangerous minority here who, for various reasons, "would just as soon have seen Russia defeated in the war."

Hopkins told Stalin "he would not have come had he not believed that the present trend could be halted." They had six meetings in ten days.

The outcome was that Stalin said he was willing to forget about Argentina. Of more importance, he said, was the termination of Lend-Lease. Inability to continue "was one thing, but the manner in which it had been done was unfortunate and even brutal." He wanted to "make it clear that he fully understood the right of the United States to curtail Lend-Lease shipments."

. . . but if the refusal . . . was designed as pressure on the Russians in order to soften them up then it was a fundamental mistake . . . If the Russians were approached frankly on a friendly basis much could be done, but that reprisals in any form would bring about the exact opposite effect.

Hopkins and Stalin agreed on a new Polish government on the basis of the Yalta stipulations. This was confirmed by Washington. In return the Soviet Union consented to accept in good faith the U.S. views on procedure in the UN, including the agenda; on these matters there was to be no veto. So the San Francisco conference was saved.

It is clear that the Soviet Union was waging no cold war at that time and that Hopkins was operating on the Roosevelt basis of give and take. The same thing is true about the Potsdam conference to which the Hopkins-Stalin discussion led. There the United States and the Soviet Union agreed "to demilitarize, de-Nazify and de-cartelize Germany." The specifications had been drafted, after study in Germany, before Roosevelt died. In this

matter Truman returned to the Roosevelt policy. After travelling with the cold war fanatics for a spell he followed Roosevelt's leadership for a brief period.

But the cold war leaders were present at Potsdam. General Arnold of our Air Force had a long talk with Air Marshall Portal of Britain. He writes: "We both believed our next enemy would be Russia, and a common line of thought emerged from our talk." He adds:

Jimmy Byrnes came out with something that struck me forcibly. He said that what we must do now was not to make the world safe for democracy, but make the world safe for the United States.

Militarism and economic imperialism! The two forces behind the cold war!

Deceptive Propaganda

The nature of this kind of war requires rearmament instead of the disarmament the world needs. For this the American people were not ready. So a campaign of deceptive propaganda was promoted, based on a twofold lie which is still widely believed. The first half of it is that we proceeded to rapid unilateral disarmament after V-J day. The second half is that the Soviet Union proceeded to get ready for aggressive attack. The American Friends' Service Committee exposed the first half of this double falsehood in its 1952 report "Toward Security Through Disarmament.":

. . . While it is true that we demobilized our army to a much larger extent than did the Russians, the military strength of the United States has never been measured by the strength of its standing army. For geographic reasons we rely primarily on sea and air power, while the Soviet Union is primarily a land power. If all categories of weapons are included, as they must be in any fair analysis of military strength, the theory of America's unilateral disarmament collapses.

Concerning aggressive attack by the Soviet Union the truth emerges from the diary of James V. Forrestal, Secretary of Defense at the time Roosevelt's foreign policy was scuttled, and the chief promoter of the propaganda that deceived the American people.

He wrote in his diary on June 10, 1946, his opinion that "the Russians would not move this summer — in fact at any time." To the same effect he quoted General Eisenhower, General Clay, Military Governor of Germany and Averell Harriman, Ambassador to Moscow. Later he says that from the Report of General Bedell

Smith, then Ambassador to Moscow, the War Council "gained the impression the Russians do not want war."

Later, when the cold war was going full blast, further evidence that the American people were being led by deception into suspicion, fear and hatred of the Soviet Union became available. In 1950, Admiral Kirk, Ambassador to Moscow, and former head of Naval Intelligence, "sees no signs that Russia expects war now." The same year George F. Kennan, of the State Department, later Ambassador to Moscow, wrote: "It is hardly likely that the Russians are now charting an early military onslaught on the Western world. . . ." Early in 1952 Winston Churchill, at a press conference here, expressed the opinion that the Soviet Union did not want war. Two weeks later Herbert Hoover, on a nationwide radio and TV hook-up, said:

There is in Europe today no such public alarm as has been fanned up in the United States. None of those nations has declared emergencies or taken measures comparable with ours. They do not propagandize war fears or war psychosis such as we get out of Washington.

Nevertheless on July '52, at West Point, President Truman said the United States:

. . . was trying to keep the peace in the face of a concerted campaign of threats of sabotage and outright aggression directed by the Soviet Union, [and that the Soviet Union is] willing to extend its power by military conquest.

Meantime the course of history had been changed by our success in making the first atomic bomb. It was successfully tested July 28, during the Potsdam Conference, which closed August 1, 1945. It was dropped on Hiroshima August 5, 1945. Why? Right after the test Forrestal wrote in his diary: "Byrnes said he was most anxious to get the Japanese affair over with before the Russians got in."

Jonathan Daniels reports in "The Man from Independence" that, as he waited for news of the test during the Potsdam conference, Truman said:

If it explodes as I think it will, I'll certainly have a hammer on those boys [the Russians].

Professor P. M. S. Blackett, physicist Nobel Prize winner in 1948, member of the British Government Advisory Committee on Atomic Energy, concludes his analysis of Hiroshima with:

The dropping of the atomic bomb was not so much the last military act of the second World War, as the first major operation of the cold diplomatic war with Russia now in progress.

Atomic Diplomacy

Thus cold war diplomacy naturally became atomic diplomacy. Reliance upon the possession of force and the threat of force went all the way from Secretary Acheson's "negotiating from positions of strength" to use of the greatest destructive force mankind had ever known.

But this decisive step was not taken without warning from responsible sources. In June, 1945, a month before the test, a committee of seven scientists who had worked on the bomb, headed by Professor James Franck, submitted a report to the Secretary of War that specified the considerations which to them made "the use of nuclear bombs in an early attack against Japan inadvisable."

The strongest objection to the use of the bomb as a weapon in diplomacy was made by Secretary of War Stimson. At first he was in favor of this policy. His memoirs show how he changed. After Potsdam he went off for three weeks rest, "in the quiet of the Adirondacks." There he "thought again about the atom and Russia." On September 11 he sent to the President a memorandum urging immediate and direct negotiations with the Russians.

The core of the document is:

To put the matter concisely, I consider the problem of our satisfactory relations with Russia as not merely connected with but as virtually dominated by the problems of the atomic bomb . . . *These relations may be perhaps irretrievably embittered by the way in which we approach the solution of the bomb with Russia. For if we fail to approach them now and merely continue to negotiate with them, having this weapon rather ostentatiously on our hip, their suspicions and their distrust of our purposes and motives will increase.* (Stimson's emphasis.)

His idea was, after discussion with the British, a proposal to the Soviet —

. . . the general purpose of which would be to control and limit the use of the atomic bomb as an instrument of war and, as far as possible, direct and encourage the development of atomic power for peaceful and humanitarian purposes.

The concluding point is:

I emphasize perhaps beyond all other considerations the importance of taking this action with Russia as a proposal of the United States—backed by Great Britain, but peculiarly the proposal of the

United States. Action of any international group of nations, including many small nations who have not demonstrated their potential power or responsibility in this war would not, in my opinion, be taken seriously by the Soviets . . . [Stimson's emphasis.]

But our policy-making was in the hands of men who could not see what Stimson saw. They were dominated by the out-of-date concept of "nationalistic military superiority" which he rejected. They deceived themselves by the illusion that the "only thing the Russians understand is force." They thought that by the monopoly of the bomb the United States could attain world dominance. September 21, 1945 a cabinet meeting was held exclusively to discuss atomic bomb policy. It was the last for Stimson who was retiring to private life. His memoirs state that "he urgently expressed again to the President and the Cabinet on the day of his retirement" his opinions previously submitted in the memorandum. Forrestal urged keeping the "secret" of the bomb and using it as a weapon in the diplomatic cold war, and won.

All mention of the Stimson memorandum was cut from the Forrestal diaries. How many of our voters ever heard or read that Stimson suggested proposing to Russia:

that we would stop work on the further improvement in, or manufacture of, the bomb as a military weapon provided the Russians and the British would agree to do likewise . . . [Also] that we should be willing to impound what bombs we now have in the United States provided the Russians and the British would agree with us that in no event would they or we use the bomb as an instrument of war unless all three governments agree to that use.

This is an application of Roosevelt's basic principle that the foundation of permanent peace is unity of the Big Three. The cold war leaders chose instead to put their trust in the sinking sand of a monopoly of the bomb.

It was two years later, December 1947, when Forrestal wrote:

The years before any possible power can . . . attack us with weapons of mass destruction are our years of opportunity.

On September 24, 1948, General Bedell Smith, Ambassador to Moscow, said:

It will be five or ten years before the Russians could count on manufacture of the bomb.

Two years later to a day President Truman announced:

We have evidence that within recent weeks an atomic explosion occurred in the USSR.

Meantime we had been slipping down toward the pit of nuclear destruction. Immediately after the rejection of Stimson's proposal, at the Ministers' Conference in London in September, 1945, which Sumner Welles called "one of the most disastrous international conferences of modern times," Molotov described Byrnes' attitude as "carrying an atom bomb in his pocket." Dulles in his book, *War and Peace*, refers to this conference as the time when "our postwar policy of 'no appeasement' was born." This means no negotiation on a give and take basis.

The concrete result was an understanding with Great Britain and Canada that a UN Commission on atomic energy should be formed and subsequently our production of the Baruch plan for atomic control, followed by our unilaterally surrounding the Soviet Union with atomic bases. The core of the Baruch plan was the ownership and control of all atomic materials and installations, including their location, by a UN Commission. This organization was to operate by majority vote and the veto was not to apply.

In view of the composition of the UN this step would have put the atomic future of the Soviet Union, and later of the socialist section of the world, under the dominance of the United States. It is inconceivable that were the situation reversed and the capitalistic section of the world in a minority, with the majority dominated by the Soviet Union, that we could accept such a proposal. Yet most of the people of the United States were made to believe for years that because they rejected this impossible proposal the Soviets were refusing any international control and inspection of atomic weapons.

Furthermore the Baruch plan directly threatened Soviet security. Two members of the Acheson-Lilienthal Commission which produced the plan saw this. Mr. Chester L. Bernard wrote: "Mr. Lilienthal and I personally begged Mr. Baruch not to introduce the veto problem." Another item in the Commission report makes the security threat plainer:

The significant fact is that at all times during the transition period such facilities—stockpiles of bombs and plants to produce [fissionable] material—will continue to be located within the U.S. Thus should there be a breakdown in the plan during the transition, we shall be in a favorable position with regard to security.

Professor Blackett, British atomic expert, correctly commented:

. . . the putting into operation of the Baruch plan would undoubtedly have led to an immediate reduction of Russian military strength relative to America, uncompensated by any clear reciprocal gain. It is certain that the early stages of the operation of the Baruch plan would be definitely detrimental to immediate Soviet security.

Concerning the survey for raw materials Professor Blackett added:

The operation of such an unlimited survey in the USSR would have given the UN inspectors—and hence the American Chiefs of staff—a fairly complete target map of the USSR.

The Baruch plan, or one of its essential features, was a part of all our atomic proposals to the Soviet Union down to 1954 when it was dropped without any explanation. Occasionally when the USSR accepted, or came within negotiable distance of accepting one of our, or the British-French, proposals we would come back with a package including one of the Baruch plan features. Nine years of opportunity to end the nuclear menace lost; nine years of more build-up of H-bombs and guided missiles!

Economic Pressure

While the Baruch plan was being prepared and discussed the United States was using economic pressure as a cold war weapon against the Soviet Union in violation of a signed agreement. On January 24, 1946, a resolution of the UN Assembly set up an Atomic Energy Commission, the Soviet Union agreeing. On June 6 Baruch presented the American Plan for atomic control to the UN. In between came the date when under the reparations agreement signed at Potsdam by President Truman and British Prime Minister Atlee, a stated amount of industrial equipment was to go from West Germany to the Soviet Union within two years; the amount was to be determined by February 2, 1946, though deliveries were to be made before that date. None was made.

In his book *I. G. Farben*, Richard Sasuly, who was at Potsdam, says that later in August the Soviet Union put in a request for advance delivery of forty-one plants. In October the Economic Directorate of the Allied Control Council agreed that thirty plants should be shipped at once. Then the French refused to be bound by the Potsdam decision because they were not represented, and they were not sent.

Byrnes argued that the French veto prevented any over-all economic control. The Soviet Union remonstrated to General Clay, American Head of German Military Government, saying that France was receiving too much financial assistance from the United States to maintain such strong opposition without our acquiescence. Clay replied that our aid was not extended for any such purpose.

The result was the economic strengthening of Germany at the expense of Soviet reconstruction. In his *Truman, Stalin and Peace* Albert Z. Carr remarks:

The question of German reparations may well have been construed by Moscow as a final test of fundamental attitudes in Washington and London.

This was made practically certain by our response to the Soviet request for a loan. Carr had been with Donald Nelson in 1943 when Roosevelt sent him to Moscow to explore postwar problems, including economic cooperation and the question of loans. He conferred at length with Molotov and Stalin. Carr reports agreement reached between Molotov and Nelson on two basic points.

1. It was in the mutual interest of Russia and America to work together in promoting sound industrial and commercial relations. . . .
2. . . . The United States had surplus of capital equipment, of manufacturing capacity, and of engineering and technical skills. Russia badly needed these same things, and had much to offer in the way of natural resources which the United States might advantageously use.

Then Stalin indicated the scale of purchases that would be made if loans came. Nelson asked to see Soviet industry and was shown everything he wanted to see. He then informed Stalin that prospects looked good.

In January, 1945 Molotov mentioned this matter to Stettinius and shortly thereafter made a formal request to the State Department for a loan of one billion dollars. The English asked for five billions and got four in 1947, to help a "loyal ally" restore its war damage. The Soviet Union whose loyalty in the war was highly praised by our command, and whose war destruction was many times that of the British, got nothing. Our State Department estimate was that 25 per cent of Soviet fixed capital was destroyed.

The Soviet request was not even acknowledged. When it was brought up months later the Department declared the application had been "lost" in its files for six months.

The Truman Doctrine

During this period Forrestal was doing his utmost to promote anti-Soviet propaganda, cultivating and briefing newspaper and magazine publishers and editors. Then came Churchill with his Fulton, Missouri speech on March 5, 1946, sanctioned by the presence of Truman.

This speech has often been placed as the beginning of the cold war. Actually it was a formal declaration of the cold war. It popularized the phrase "the iron curtain" which was invented by Goebbels. Churchill called for an Anglo-American military alliance in defense of "Western civilization." To him this meant saving the British empire, his lifelong mission. To this end he now sought to use the United States strength against the Soviet Union as in the war he had tried to use Soviet strength against Germany, always with an eye toward the future of British imperialism.

The opportunity came a year later as the cold war gathered momentum after the Churchill speech. The British had put a reactionary king upon the throne in Greece, and for three years had been fighting the Greek resistance at a cost of 250 million a year. Stettinius had issued a statement deploring British action and on one occasion, when their troops fired on an unarmed demonstration, our consul had lowered our flag in token of disapproval. In February 1947 the British told the State Department they could no longer support their troops in Greece and if we didn't do something about it communism would win.

This was using the cold war for blackmail and General Marshall, Secretary of State, wired British Foreign Minister Bevin a strong protest. But on March 12, 1947 President Truman, in a speech attacking the Soviet Union, announced that we were arming Greece and Turkey, and would come to the aid of any nation in the free world asking help to resist aggression. The word is aimed at the Soviet Union, the organized expression of communism. It is one of the words which the cold war has expanded beyond all reasonable meaning, until it encompasses even "indirect aggression" which covers everything hostile to cold war objectives. This declaration has become known as the "Truman Doctrine."

As Professor Williams notes, the policy is worldwide and unilateral in character. It expands Truman's decision of February 21, 1947, to by-pass the United Nations as an agency for economic

relief. It was an instrument to realize the cold war objective of that period. This was containment. It was outlined by George Kennan then chief of the Policy Planning Division of the State Department, (first in February 1946 in answer to a request for his views on the Iranian situation, then in a special report to Forrestal a year later). It was made public in an article in *Foreign Affairs* in April 1947, with official clearance.

The fallacies in this objective need not be discussed since Kennan has recently changed his position. In January '58 he came out for neutralization of Germany and other countries in Central Europe, warned against strengthening NATO, opposed equipping NATO armies in Europe with tactical atomic weapons, and urged our NATO allies to refuse the offer of our missiles. In the winter of 1958-1959 issue of *Foreign Affairs* Kennan asked "whether one could not welcome and join in the search for solutions" less dangerous and less obviously unacceptable to Soviet interests than the simple unilateral retirement from Eastern Europe which the present Western position seems to demand. He said we had to accept something like the Polish plan to neutralize Central Europe or pay a bitter price for dismissing all Soviet offers as "just propaganda." He wrote that it is:

doubly important that the Western position at this crucial juncture should be one of the utmost liberality, scope and flexibility, involving a real readiness to compromise where compromise is permissible and to accept the lesser risks for the sake of avoiding the major ones.

There is however one point concerning the containment objective that needs to be noted because it is equally true about its successor, the goal of liberation. It is a point never brought into the open by the cold war leaders but it has been and is underneath all they attempt. It is that their ultimate objective is more than the containment of the Soviet Government or communism, between which they swing back and forth in confusion. It is more than "a definitive change in, or the actual destruction of, the Soviet government", as Professor Williams puts it. It is more than the liberation of peoples from despotism and tyranny as our relations with the dictatorships of Latin America, Europe and Asia prove. Their final goal is to prevent socialist economy from moving into communist economy by replacing it with capitalist economy, using the threat of force and, if need be, the use of force.

The demonstration of this is in the present statements of non-military cold-war leaders to the effect that economic warfare is now the most important section of the cold war. This is the opposite of the mutually beneficial economic relations that would help pave the way to peaceful economic change; the opposite also of friendly competition in the efficiency of economic aid to industrially undeveloped peoples such as has grown up in India between Russians and West Germans, each aiding in building a steel mill. "We are both helping India in good peaceful competition" the Ukrainian laboratory chief of the Soviet-aided plant told an American reporter. The economic aim of the cold war planners is the surrender or destruction of the economic enemy — a Communist-led socialist economy. Until this objective is abandoned there can be no peaceful coexistence.

The cold war and the Truman doctrine led to Korea. Korea led to the support of Chiang and the exclusion of the real China from the UN. The cold war created NATO and the Soviet Union countered with the Warsaw Pact. The formation of the Federal German Republic was followed by the creation of the German Democratic Republic. West Germany was included in NATO and in return East Germany was taken into the Warsaw Pact. West Germany was rearmed and East Germany created a military police. West Germany — and who else — is to get nuclear weapons and what will the Soviet Union do about that? The cold war bred the preventive war insanity, now we have the limited war madness. The chance of stopping it with nuclear weapons scattered around, and under the control of subordinates, is little better than the possibility of stopping an explosion in a powder magazine after a lighted fuse is thrown in. As Premier Khrushchev said in a recent letter to President Eisenhower: "We have no moral right to play about with fire in a powder magazine."

The cold war makes peaceful coexistence impossible on three counts. It substitutes conflict for cooperation. If the Soviet leaders are the kind of people its propaganda describes it is impossible to live peaceably with them. In the last analysis the cold war seeks to remove coexistence itself.

The magnitude of the menace of the cold war derives from its separation from objective reality. Its leaders are unable to adjust themselves to two revolutionary facts which are changing the course

of human existence. One is a new economic technique, the other is a new source of energy with unlimited power for advance or destruction. Consequently they are blind leaders of the blind — attempting the impossible. They cannot turn the clock back but they can stop it for about half the world. The estimate of the recent Australasian conference on radiation biology was that a major nuclear war would kill half the world's population and greatly damage the genetic inheritance of the survivors.

There is only one way in which that can be prevented or avoided. That is to disarm the world and proceed to use the new power cooperatively, for the general good of mankind. In so doing all nations can find out experimentally which economic system, or what combination of parts of both, will best accomplish this end. This is the method demanded alike by science and the ethical principles that have been developed in the course of human living.

Before following the course of the effort at disarmament since our dropping of the Baruch plan in 1954, it is necessary to note the change which occurred in the objective of the cold war in 1952. In reply to a question as to what would be the differences between Republicans and Democrats in the election campaign of that year Dulles replied:

Liberation versus containment will be the basic issue on which the two parties are most sharply in conflict and on which the positive and dynamic approach of the Republican Party will come into headlong collision with the negative, defensive policy of containing communism, the policy being pursued by the Truman administration.

Here again cold war policy is attempting the impossible. Where in history has a politico-economic system been overthrown when it was giving the more numerous underlying section of the population more than it had before? In the Soviet Union, and the rest of the socialist bloc, the people farthest down have been liberated from hunger, from illiteracy and the major preventable diseases. As a young woman in one of the new Chinese communes said to Anna Louise Strong: "Mr. Dulles can't talk to us. Before we didn't eat. Now we do." Even Allen Dulles, head of the Central Intelligence Agency, with his hundred million a year, besides extras, to spend secretly in inciting and aiding counter revolution, admits that the Soviet standard of living is better than it was before for most of the population.

On top of the economic betterment is the admission to the world of culture of "the man with the hoe", the sickle and the hammer, and the gaining of a creative purpose for human living that encompasses the continuous development of all the capacities of mankind — personal and social; material, intellectual and spiritual. The documentary evidence that this is the over-all goal of Soviet economic planning and education is indisputable. That it is being continuously attempted is attested by educational experts from various capitalist countries who examined Soviet education during the past year. As long as this attempt goes on, no matter what the failures, there will be no possibility of overthrowing the Soviet Government, under the guise of liberation or any similar self deceptive slogan. As Raymond Robins, who saw and dealt with the Soviet revolution in our behalf and that of mankind, said to a Senate Committee on his return:

My reading of history, gentleman, tells me that the only answer to the demand for a better life is a better life.

Some of the cold war leaders, especially the late Secretary of State Dulles, have brought the deep-seated emotions of religion into the relations between us and the Soviet Union. There have been continuous references to the "godless" or "atheistic" Russians, and to their alleged lack of the ethical principles of religion. The President and the Vice-President both did it recently. This use of religion led Khrushchev to remark that our leaders talked a good deal about God but he thought they would have difficulty in getting God's approval for some of their positions. The editor of the *New Statesman*, in England, commented that this was the first time that religion had been made an instrument of foreign policy since Philip II of Spain invaded Britain with his armada. A world wide reaction sees this as another instance of the hypocrisy in our moral claims for the cold war.

The Cold War and Disarmament

It is the collision between cold war objectives and the Soviet desire and need for peaceful coexistence that is basically responsible for the delays and difficulties on the key issue of disarmament. The differences in tactics in the disarmament negotiations derive from the opposite natures of peaceful coexistence and cold warfare.

One depends upon disarmament for its realization and the other upon superior armaments for its success.

The record of the disarmament discussions since we dropped the Baruch plan in 1954, is a twisting series of proposals, rejections and counter proposals. The Soviet leaders were trying to find a formula that would meet our needs without yielding to the cold war threat. Our leaders were trying to avoid a definite commitment to end production of nuclear weapons and the outlawing of nuclear war.

In May 1955 the Soviet Union, in an attempt to combine their viewpoint with that of the United States, offered three resolutions to the United Nations. These resolutions constituted a plan similar to one proposed by the British and the French in an effort to include features of both the United States and Soviet positions. The U. S. joined in sponsoring this plan in March 1955, two months before the Soviet proposals, and later proclaimed reservations on points at which the Soviet Union was getting close agreement. That was the year of the Geneva summit conference which made the whole world feel that tensions were lessening. Agreement was reached in principle on important issues, especially the German question. The Foreign Ministers were directed to work out the specific steps to be taken. The U.S. and the USSR couldn't agree on the details of German unification. Dulles promptly proclaimed that they had broken their agreement, just as Truman had previously done about the Yalta agreement concerning the Polish question, and the cold war was on again.

The persistent difference, and for the Soviets the most important, has been whether a complete disarmament plan should be agreed upon or whether agreements should be concluded to cover each stage in turn, as the United States has contended since 1945. The Soviet objection is that this takes too long and meantime the death-dealing weapons pile up and the possibilities of their use increase. They maintain that our proposals evade a definite commitment on prohibition of atomic warfare and, as the Baruch plan admittedly did, seek meantime to enable the United States to maintain a superior position. The U. S. holds that comprehensive disarmament can only be carried out safely as "parallel progress is made in the solution of important political issues in the world." The Soviet Union takes the position that "armament reduction in

itself will serve to ease tensions, and particularly the prohibition of nuclear warfare."

The record of thirteen years of failure to get agreement concerning disarmament shows that the differences between us and the Soviet Union are either due to, or are increased by, the objectives of the cold war, which decree that we continue to seek preponderance of armed force. Consequently the prospect not merely for peaceful coexistence but for the whole future of mankind depends upon whether these objectives are abandoned by us, and cold war methods thereby made obsolete.

This conclusion is reinforced by the economic aspects of the cold war. During its existence United States trade with the Soviet Union has been reduced from the high wartime figures to the average pre-war level since recognition. This means corresponding loss of the good will that was being developed in both the business and labor circles engaged in that trade, and also loss of the influence of that goodwill upon political relations. In the 1955 first resolution proposed by the Soviet Union to the UN General Assembly point 7 is that the Assembly

. . . considers it necessary that states in their economic relations eliminate every discrimination which hampers the development of broad economic cooperation between them, first of all in the field of trade. . . .

Without the elimination of these obstacles to the development of international trade it is impossible to expect real relief of international tension.

There is still no trade agreement with the Soviet Union and discrimination and abnormal credit terms still exist. In his interview with the industrialist Cyrus Eaton, Khrushchev said:

I want peace and I am prepared to sit down any time and negotiate an agreement where we can trade together and exchange ideas.

An attempt at indirect pressure in the opposite direction is our political use of economic aid to industrially undeveloped countries.

The USSR in 1955 proposed a Security Council Resolution, which declared that at the end of its plan to prohibit nuclear weapons and remove them from use within definite time limits in 1957,

All atomic material will then be used solely for peaceful purposes. The states shall undertake to promote broad international co-

operation in the peaceful uses of atomic energy . . . Special attention should be given to the rendering of assistance to economically undeveloped countries. Such assistance should not be made conditional upon any demands of a political or military nature. . . .

Still another economic aspect of the cold war is the degree to which its increase of expenditures for armaments ties a part of business and labor to cold war policies. The economist Victor Perlo concludes that one reason why the downturn in the economy did not last as long as his previous estimate was the rise in military spending occasioned by the Quemoy and Lebanon incidents.

More Cold War Consequences

Another consequence of the cold war is the wave of repression it has generated by the hostility it created against the Soviet Union as the expression and promoter of communism. The war emotions of suspicion, fear and hate, unable to reach the enemy abroad in action, expressed themselves at home in anti-democratic legislation, unconstitutional investigations, and a general witch hunt against communists, fellow travellers, left wingers, and advocates of any social welfare proposals which communists had ever supported. Religious and academic freedom were attacked and diminished. Historians will write it down as the era of the lists of "subversive" organizations, the Smith Act trials and imprisonments, the Rosenberg executions, the rise to fame and power of McCarthy, the separation of families by heartless deportations, the government use of paid informers and proved perjurers—the blackest page in the history of our democratic rights. And this was done not by the heated passions of war time but under the vicious stimulation of the cold war.

The effect of all this upon our relations with the Soviet Union was to silence most of the opposition to cold war policy. Except for some differences over degree and method, it became bi-partisan in Congress and so totalitarian in nature. Private discussion of it was reduced to the hardy souls who were willing to take the risk of losing jobs, going to jail, enduring special ostracism. This minority alone kept alive the work for friendship with the Soviet Union. The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship had to get along for three months without the services of its Executive

Director, the Rev. Richard Morford. He was sent to jail for refusing on grounds of conscience and constitutional rights to turn over organization records to the House Committee on Un-American Activities.

A national peace movement such as existed before the war became impossible. Even local peace groups were listed as subversive. Advocates of peace were denied the right to attend international peace conferences and, save again for the few scattered individuals who refused to be intimidated, the world peace movement was deprived of direct news or counsel from the United States. Also that movement was denied organizational connection with the nation which widespread world opinion held was becoming the greatest menace to the possibility of a warless world. The international attempt to ban the bomb was labelled subversive.

The effect of this repression was that the people who otherwise would have rallied to restore the Roosevelt policy of cooperation with the Soviet Union for world peace and progress were made afraid to go to meetings, to read things opposed to the cold war foreign policy, to go to see, or even to be seen with, former friends who were, or had been, so opposed. This was a brake upon progress in the needed friendship between two great world powers that was more far reaching than the direct violations of the First Amendment.

This situation was increased by the sudden revelation of the shocking violations of the Soviet constitution in the last years of Stalin. Too many of the friends of the Soviet Union had been defending everything that happened there. Too many more had been historically expecting too much. They had failed to recognize the existence of the universality of evil, the enduring nature of the ills to which all human flesh is heir. The shock of the sudden revelation of this historic fact threw many of them off balance and some into the opposite position. Others have come to learn that what counts in the judgment of systems and peoples is the overall direction, which is determined in large part by the willingness to admit wrongdoing and sincerely attempt to correct it.

Another significant part of the menace of our policy of hostility to the Soviet Union to the future of mankind is the extent to which it has made the United Nations a battleground of the cold war and so diverted it from a part of its original purpose — securing

friendly relations between the two political-economic systems now dividing the world. This fact also increased the un-democratic nature of the organization and the development of anti-democratic practices.

From the beginning the United States had a built-in majority of the votes in the UN Assembly on any anti-Soviet proposal with which the British agreed. The U.S. was almost certain to get 20 Latin-American votes plus the Philippines and Liberia. The Anglo-American bloc could count as certain 35 votes out of some 50 odd countries. In the Security Council it had a watertight majority and with the real China left out still has. This majority in action, as Arthur Krock, *N.Y. Times* columnist noted about the admission of Argentina at the organizing conference, was and is like the "steamroller of a national convention." Imagine United States behavior if the majority were reversed in favor of the socialist bloc and it had acted as we have through the cold war period!

The situation has been improved since the enlargement of the membership bringing in Asian-African and Middle-East influence, with accompanying signs of independence coming from Latin-America. Also we learned from the Soviet boycott of the UN committee because it had a built-in Western majority. So the Commission on Disarmament that meets in January 1960 has five members from the Western, and five from the Soviet bloc. But as a Soviet delegate reminded the members before the vote on Lebanon, there remains the influence of financial aid from the United States, or the expectation of it.

The dangerous fact is that using the UN as a battleground of the cold war increases the antipathy between two rival economic systems, whereas the possibility of a peaceful world depends upon the UN functioning to lessen that hostility and bring about whatever cooperation is possible, in meeting the world's needs.

Cultural Exchange

As is well known a powerful force to that end is cultural exchange. The first of the resolutions proposed to the UN Assembly in 1955 by the Soviet Union asks for the declaration that:

An important means of improving mutual understanding and bringing the peoples closer together is also the expansion of international cultural relations, specifically through the broad exchange of delegations and mutual visits by people engaged in

industry, agriculture, trade, science, culture and the arts, delegations of students and through the development of tourist travel.

Since the declaration there has been a marked increase of cultural exchange between the U. S. and the USSR especially in the years 1958-1959. It was stimulated by an agreement on scientific and cultural exchange signed January 27, 1958. The governments set the pace by permitting the mutual exchange of two official illustrated magazines designed to make the peoples of each country better acquainted with those of the other; their respective titles are *Amerika* — circulating in the Soviet Union for us, and *USSR* — circulating in the United States for them.

Particularly effective in spreading understanding of the kind of people each of us are, and so increasing goodwill between us, has been the visits here of Soviet dance groups and musicians, and of our musicians there — especially Van Cliburn winner of the International Tchaikovsky contest and Paul Robeson, the world famous singer. Similar results followed the exhibitions in the chief Soviet cities of our artist Rockwell Kent, and from the contacts of visiting farmers and agricultural experts at the grass roots level. Unfortunately the same is true in lesser degree with industrial labor than with experts and business men, due to the unfortunate blindness of top labor leaders to the value of such contacts.

Equally important in dispelling many misunderstandings has been the visits of national figures such as Eleanor Roosevelt, Adlai Stevenson and Cyrus Eaton, the Cleveland industrialist. Very significant for the future is the exchange of groups of students. Three Amherst student editors recently sent 1,000 copies of their paper to the University of Moscow with the promise of the Soviet Ministry of Education that they would be distributed to 1,000 students there. They hope this will start a series of student paper exchanges.

Especially significant are findings of groups of educators who studied the Soviet educational system. One of them was a group of ten headed by Lawrence G. Derthick, U. S. Commissioner of Education. After his return he told the National Press Club:

... We were simply not prepared for the degree to which the USSR, as a nation, is committed to education as a means of national advancement. Everywhere we went we saw indication after indication of what we could only conclude amounted to a total commitment to education. Our major reaction, therefore, is one of astonishment—and I choose that word carefully—at the extent to which this seems to have been accomplished.

Dr. Derthick was particularly impressed with the close participation of Soviet parents with teachers in educational work. He found the quality of teachers very high; their prestige great; their classes not overcrowded. Funds were available in abundance; evening courses and correspondence courses for workers abounded throughout the country; everywhere expansion was going on; curricula were varied and of high quality.

In all scientific fields there has been in the past year a significant growth of interchange of knowledge and methods in various international conferences. The results have been mutual respect for the gains made by each and an increased desire to interchange knowledge and increase it by pooling effort. This expression of the inherent demand of science for one world naturally requires abandonment of the cold war effort to eliminate the Soviet Union as our mortal enemy.

It Can Be Done

To do this requires a motive as strong as that which produced the cooperation and friendship of wartime. That motive exists. It is the need for joint action to escape the threat of nuclear war annihilation and future genetic suffering and incapacity, and to help the rest of the world escape these evils. The cold war tactics as well as its aims have prevented this motive from producing joint action.

This prevention was a gradual process, beginning with the substitution of conflict for cooperation in specific issues and moving on up to containment and liberation. The reversal will also have to be gradual. It has already begun in the dropping of containment and the reducing of liberation to an almost dead letter. The return to give-and-take negotiation has started in the current conferences on tests and surprise attacks. The pressures from cultural exchange, trade needs, and world wide desires are on the increase.

How much is yet to be done here to end the cold war and establish cooperation in trying to end all war is shown by the recent announcement of the leader of the Democratic Party in the Senate that there will be no change in foreign policy. Shortly thereafter, in the discussion extending the draft, Chairman Carl Vinson of the Senate Armed Services Committee declared:

We know that the cold war will continue. We know that there will probably be future Lebanons and future Formosas.

These utterances tell us that to end the cold war is a race against time. They also emphasize the fact that the cold war will not be ended by formal declaration but by a change in foreign policy objectives. This will begin when nuclear weapons are outlawed as the first step in disarmament. That will become possible when atom tests are completely stopped.

The importance of this step is magnified by our recent extension of nuclear bases. Also by our negative attitude toward Soviet proposals for atom-free peace zones in the Baltic Sea area, the Balkans and the Adriatic; and to united proposals for a similar zone in Central Europe.

Atomic experts and military leaders are warning us that no inspection can be absolutely fool proof. This means there is a point where both sides have to trust the mutual interest in avoiding the consequences of using nuclear weapons, and the decencies common to mankind that recoil from letting those consequences loose. This fact means that the risk of relying upon the probability that no nation will invite suicide and undying infamy is less than the risk of continuing the cold war.

The course of events indicates that recognition of this truth is growing. The cold war developed inside our government unnoticed by the great majority of our citizens. Its purposes were concealed behind deceptive propaganda concerning Soviet intentions, and moral slogans remote from actual realities like "free world"; "the right of all peoples to choose their own form of government and way of life"; "liberation". Now the effort to end the cold war and the opposition to this attempt is out in the open and its actions are broadcast around the world. The record of cold war falsehoods has been revealed and its moral claims are being exposed as fraudulent. World wide forces are gathering against it. Scientists who participated in the creation of its nuclear weapon are realizing that their function is to increase life not death. The Secretary of the United Nations has recently stated that "the natural function of its executive", is first "to keep problems as much as possible outside the cold war orbit" and second "to lift problems outside of the orbit to all the extent he can."

VI.

Which Way Now?

THE PROSPECT of ending the cold war has been considerably improved by the recent visits to this country of Anastas I. Mikoyan, First Deputy Premier of the USSR and Premier N. S. Khrushchev. Both went across the continent and back. Both saw and talked with a cross section of our population. The Premier made many speeches to varied audiences and was seen and heard by millions on a nation wide TV hook up.

Deputy Premier Mikoyan came ostensibly as a tourist to see how this country had changed since he saw it in 1936. From what he did and said here, and in his report after his return, it is evident that his real purpose was to take soundings on the attitude of our people toward the peoples of the Soviet Union; the ending of the cold war, and the replacing of it with peaceful co-existence.

Whether it was designed or just happened so, Deputy Premier Mikoyan explored the ground later covered by Premier Khrushchev, and where he found suitable soil he dropped seed which Premier Khrushchev later cultivated. In the field of policy both concentrated on ending the cold war and returning to the search for agreement instead of reliance upon force and the threat of force. In addition Premier Khrushchev stressed making peaceful coexistence positive by competitive cooperation for mutual benefit and in aid to the non-industrial peoples. In concrete issues both sought four power discussion of the German and West Berlin issue and a trade agreement with us.

On their return both reported the spontaneity and extent of the expressions of friendship and goodwill they were requested to convey to their peoples. That this has been much increased by the visits is clear from the discussion now going on here. Underneath this fact is what they both did, and especially the powerful personality of Premier Khrushchev, to destroy the distorted picture of

Soviet leaders as the embodiment of all evil. His honest critics had to admit the presence of a big man with his share of the failings that all mankind is heir to. Except for the cold war extremists, those who saw and heard him over TV are not likely to be deceived by the devil theory in foreign affairs as an explanation of all that is wrong with the world. By the testimony of one who travelled with them, some of the hard boiled journalists trained in opposition to all things Soviet were convinced by close contact that here was a leader who really wanted a warless world.

A Three-fold Challenge

More important however than the impact of his powerful personality is the fact that Premier Khrushchev left with us a three-fold challenge: to join with the peoples of the Soviet Union in ending the cold war; to start work on a concrete plan, through the UN for universal total disarmament; to substitute for the cold war mutually beneficial competition to show whose way of life can contribute more to meeting the material and spiritual needs of mankind, and to the development of all the capacities of the human race.

What response did this challenge get, and is it getting from our government and people?

On his return Premier Khrushchev told his people, through a broadcast news conference, he was convinced that President Eisenhower "sincerely wanted to liquidate the cold war." He then warned that powerful forces here wanted to continue it:

It will be difficult to overcome all that has accumulated in the cold war . . . It will require great effort and patience.

These three objectives are interdependent; together they make an outline program for realizing the possibilities of modern living. The determining core of the program is complete disarmament. On its military front the cold war is the nuclear arms race. End that and the other fronts—the economic conflict and the propaganda contest—can gradually be eliminated. With universal disarmament the issue of conflicting social systems is settled by demonstration and discussion. This program offers the only way in which one social and economic order can replace another without the warfare which today means coming close to mutual annihilation and imperiling the future of mankind.

The Counter Offensive

Premier Khrushchev also told the Soviet peoples in his home coming broadcast that President Eisenhower's job was harder than his. "My people are with me but he has powerful persons (and forces) against him."

Immediately thereafter these forces and persons started their counter-offensive against the Premier's challenge. His proposals are Utopian and propagandist, they asserted; they provide no system of control for disarmament; they are a deceptive device to cover the purpose of world domination. Their one value, Ex-Governor Harriman declared, was that "they alerted the American people to the seriousness of the Soviet threat." The first shot in this propaganda barrage had been fired before Khrushchev arrived. On Sept. 2 *Look Magazine*, claiming entry into 16,850,000 households, advertised an issue to contain an article by Averell Harriman, who had recently returned from talks with the Soviet Premier. "The ex-Ambassador to Russia explains why nothing will deflect Khrushchev from his goal of world domination." On October 25 the Macmillan publishing House took a full page in the *New York Times* weekly Book Review section to advertise "the story of a man who ruled Russia long before Khrushchev, but a man who had the same dream of leading his country to world dominance . . ."

As a personal or national objective this is false. The truth is that the Soviet desire that their social system should extend throughout the world is exactly the same as our desire for our system, and for the same belief that this would be for the benefit of all mankind.

In the October 24 issue of the *Saturday Evening Post* the leading editorial is an attempt to discount Premier Khrushchev's visit. Its concluding words are:

. . . there is reason to hope that the bulk of our people are now alerted to the very real danger before them.

On October 16, the man who shapes the whole propaganda of the State Department, Andrew H. Berding, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, stated the policy of the Department concerning Premier Khrushchev's challenge in an address to the National Association of Broadcasters. He said that to end the cold war requires:

. . . the just and equitable solution of the legacy of injustice which the past fourteen years has produced. It requires the assurance that the future will not unfold under the menace of an arbitrary power than can be wielded by a few over the many.

This is plainly the one-time Dulles' goal of "liberation" dressed up in moral generalizations.

On October 1 Berding had told the League of Republican Women in Washington that:

. . . We have given the Soviet Union solemn assurances that we have no desire to turn these nations [Communist bloc] against Moscow. But we do desire for these people freedom, genuine national independence, and ability to establish whatever forms of government and social institutions they wish.

What did we do in Guatemala? And in Iran? What is Allen Dulles doing in the Communist bloc? And what is any solemn assurance of ours worth after our arming of Germany with nuclear weapons?

Implying that the Soviet Union is responsible for what is happening in Tibet and is threatening in regard to Taiwan, Berding makes the astonishing statement that if the Soviet Union is sincere about wanting peace

. . . we believe it has the leverage, through the oft-claimed monolithic nature of the Communist camp, to insure a measure of responsibility on the part of the Communist Party.

There is no such thing as the "monolithic nature of the Communist camp." What does exist is the doctrine and practice of the monolithic nature of the Soviet Communist Party laid down by Lenin. For some time Moscow has proclaimed that there are various roads to communism according to the history and present situation of a nation. If State Department policy is being formed with disregard of this it is indeed a menace to friendly relations between the US and the USSR.

The extent to which the State Department is still pursuing cold war tactics is evident in the current series of needless and useless provocations offered the Soviet Union: the revival in the Laos situation of the principle of Soviet responsibility for the actions of its "satellites", up to an arbitrary limit set by us. So imply Soviet responsibility for invasion by Northern Vietnam, at the same time admitting that we have no evidence of invasion; opposition to the giving to Poland the seat in the UN Security Council that belongs to the Eastern bloc under the gentleman's agreement of 1946 which we now claim was only for one year although we still recognize its other terms; the emphasizing in our press and in the UN the anniversary of the Hungarian revolt.

A more serious cold war move than any of these, or all of them put together, was the announcement by our NATO Commander that by the end of the year other nations would receive nuclear weapons, in addition to those the Congress approved along with Germany, before it adjourned.

It is evident that if the President wants to thaw out the cold war he will have to change the prevailing policy in both the State Department and the Congress. This he cannot do without sufficient grass roots pressure. To create this all who want friendly and peace-making relations with the Soviet Union need to join in bringing to the surface in effective action the latent desire to have done with the disastrous cold war which Premier Khrushchev's visit, and previous public opinion tests, have demonstrated to exist.

If this is not done the cold war will end as all other armament races have. In our day this nation fought a war to make the world safe for democracy, then a war to end war. If we get into another it will not really be war as it has been historically known. It will be a long distance mutual massacre and destruction on a scale never before experienced. Those writers who are foreseeing a generation or more of diminishing cold war tensions are as far from objective reality as the preventive war extremists and the limited war moderates. The actual and increasing possibilities of the final war starting through errors or planned provocation are too many to gamble with.

History has brought mankind to the cross roads. It is either end the cold war as the first step to ending all war or the long darkness.

Which is it to be?

Total Universal Disarmament

Our reaction to the Soviet proposal for total universal disarmament has been more positive than our position on ending the cold war. The Soviet plan was concisely described by Premier Khrushchev in his UN speech:

The essence of our proposal is that over a period of four years all states would effect complete disarmament and should no longer have any means of waging war.

These "means" are then specified:

This covers armies, navies and air forces; general staffs and war ministries; military educational establishments; military bases in foreign territories; all atomic and hydrogen bombs; military rockets of all ranges.

The states would be left only with a militia, to the amount agreed upon for each country, "armed with small arms and intended exclusively for maintaining order and protecting the personal security of the citizens." This program should not hold up the effort to discontinue "nuclear weapons tests for all times." It is to be carried out in a progressive series of stages.

If the Western powers are not ready

... to embark on general and complete disarmament, the Soviet government is ready to come to agreement with other states on the appropriate partial steps of disarmament and the strengthening of security.

The Soviet Union holds these to be the major steps:

1. . . . a zone of control and inspection, with a reduction of foreign troops on the territories of the respective countries of Western Europe.
2. . . . an atom free central zone in Central Europe.
3. . . . the withdrawal of all foreign troops from the territories of European states and the liquidation of military bases on foreign territories.
4. . . . a non-aggression pact between the NATO member states and the states party to the Warsaw treaty.
5. . . . an agreement on the prevention of a surprise attack by one state upon another.

President Eisenhower stated his position concerning total disarmament both before and after Premier Khrushchev's visit. The day before the Premier's arrival, to a News Conference question about the announcement that a proposal about universal total disarmament would be made, he said his basic principle is that

... universal disarmament is really the one great hope of the world's living in peace in the future years.

The joint communiques on the results of the private talks between the President and the Premier at the end of his tour states that the participants are:

... agreed that the question of general disarmament is the most important facing the world today. Both governments will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of the problem.

The President's position on the Soviet plan, supported by a number of national leaders of both parties, is that it deserves serious scrutiny. Consequently, with each side making some concessions, we cooperated with the Soviet Union in co-sponsoring a United Nations, unanimously adopted, resolution that sends the Soviet plan, along with others, but first on the agenda, to the ten-nation Com-

mission on Disarmament, five representatives from each side, which is supposed to meet early in January.

The State Department, however, is far from commitment to the principle of total disarmament. Witness the statement concerning it by Berding, the Department's mouth-piece on policy, previously quoted. Reston, the *N. Y. Times* top Washington man, who usually knows what is happening in the Department, reports that in the discussion of Premier Khrushchev's visit now going on privately, one of the topics is:

. . . thorough review of all aspects of the arms problem, including a careful study of Mr. Khrushchev's total disarmament proposal to see whether the present balance of power can be maintained with fewer forces on both sides.

As if the world wide demand for national independence, plus the mutual suicide of atomic warfare, were not sending the balance of power, along with more of the doctrines of traditional diplomacy in the imperialist era, to join the dodo and other pre-historic animals. Balance in the possession of nuclear weapons, possessed by the US and the USSR, today means that each has enough to destroy most of the other and to poison the blood stream of an unlimited amount of the rest of the race.

It is those in every branch of our government, who will not, or cannot, adjust themselves to the new world being made by atomic energy who constitute the real roadblock to the President's "basic principle." They cannot today dismiss the Soviet proposal with the contempt with which its forerunner was treated in the League of Nations in 1927. But they are working for the smallest partial disarmament they can get away with. At a Committee on Sane Nuclear Policy meeting in Carnegie Hall New York on October 24, 3000 persons heard Norman Cousins, Editor of the *Saturday Review* say that he was on a program recently when one of the commentators said we should make it appear "to take seriously" the Soviet proposal but should have no part of it. Cousins added: "If that is the policy of our government then God help us."

The Question of Control

The main weapon so far of the opponents of the Soviet disarmament proposal has been the question of control and inspection. Their criticism is that the proposal gave no details of control. In a lot of the press this gets to be "no control." Actually these details

are not in order now. They belong to the UN Commission on Disarmament when it meets in January. Actually the Soviet proposal is very specific about the necessity and nature of control, and how it is to be worked out.

To insure that no one would violate their obligations, we propose the setting up of an international control body comprising all states. There should be initiated a system of control over all disarmament measures which should be created and should function in conformity with the stage by which disarmament should be effected. If disarmament is comprehensive and complete, then upon its attainment control will also be general and complete.

In his national TV broadcast Premier Khrushchev stated his government wanted "comprehensive control." This is the phrase used in the British proposal. Introducing the Soviet proposal for complete and general disarmament in the UN, Deputy Foreign Minister Kuznetsov declared that if it were accepted, deciding the details of inspection and control would not be difficult. Certainly they would be much easier than for partial disarmament because it is more difficult to conceal the return of armaments. That would be a matter of local and general knowledge and national peace groups could undertake to inform the world enforcement body in charge of any violation. In his talks with labor leaders Premier Khrushchev indicated an item in the Soviet plan which would make inspection agreement easier. He pointed out that the air bases around the Soviet Union create suspicion and fear that inspection by outsiders would be used for military reconnaissance. With the removal of the bases the suspicion and fears would disappear.

The main difference between the US and the USSR that has appeared in present attempts at control and inspection has been over the priority of the principle of abolition and that of the necessary controls to secure it. We have wanted the latter worked out before agreeing to the former. The Soviet government has insisted on the former as the beginning of any agreement. After a long deadlock in the nuclear tests committee some one pointed out that the two principles are interdependent. Therefore the thing to do was to agree tentatively to both of them as the beginning of a treaty and then proceed to discussion of details. With the log jam thus broken open agreement has been reached on most of the details.

In the attempt to agree on measures to prevent surprise attacks the deadlock is over priority of either technical or political

measures, the Soviet insisting on the former, we the latter. Our UN top delegate Henry Cabot Lodge recently announced that we have withdrawn our insistence and will proceed to discuss both aspects simultaneously. On the precedent of the tests committee this should secure Soviet support.

Economic Consequences of Disarmament

There remains the question of the effect of disarmament upon the economy of a nation. Because of its economic planning, full employment and increasing consumer demands total disarmament raises no economic problem in the Soviet Union. Here special measures are needed in advance, especially in communities now entirely dependent upon war production, to prevent unbearable losses by business men and professionals, as well as labor. In general other forms of production and labor have to be found for that share of the national economy which has a vested interest in war production. There is currently wide expression by business men and economists of the view that the size of the dislocation caused by total disarmament is not beyond the capacity of our economy to remedy. This judgment relies upon our experience in handling the partial disarmament that occurred after World Wars I and II, and after Korea.

The *N. Y. Times* account of the discussion between Premier Khrushchev and leading financiers and industrialists at the home of former Ambassador, ex-Governor Harriman, says they told the Premier that "the demands of the American economy are such that greater profits can be made on consumer production." However that may be, there is wider testimony of the extent to which consumer needs now unmet could replace war production expenditure.

The October issue of the U.S. Chamber of Commerce magazine is "What Peace Would Do to You." The answer is on the basis of "softening of cold war pressures", and partial disarmament. The principal changes business should expect are:

... a rise in consumer spending far surpassing the cut in military spending and concentrated on such things as houses, automobiles, furniture, household appliances. A terrible upsurge for new plants and equipment. Larger income for everybody to spend and invest. A higher standard of living. Lower taxes. A larger labor force. Increased pressure for federal aid of various kinds. Temporary threat of inflation which can be readily countered.

Some industries and individuals would be hurt temporarily. Then comes the question: "How quickly and to what extent would consumer buying take up the slack left by reduced military spending?" The answer is: "Probably in one year, certainly in two, the economy would be stronger than ever." This prediction is supported by analysis of what happened in 1919 after World War I, in World War II, and in 1955 after Korea. The conclusion is that "In the long run the economy can grow as fast with a low as with a high military component." Moreover, "the civilian market grows in more stable fashion than does the military . . ."

Testimony to the same effect was given to a group of Soviet economists brought here by the Committee for Economic Development to be shown how our economic system works. In a discussion at the National Bureau of Economic Research concerning the adequacy of the Bureau's measurements of economic growth they were assured by Dr. Arthur F. Burns, former Chairman of the President's Council of Economic Advisers that on the basis of our experience after World War II and the Korean war "substantial disarmament would not greatly affect the American economy."

The degree to which these opinions are valid for total disarmament depends upon the role played by the Chamber of Commerce item "Increased pressure for federal aid of various kinds," especially upon the amount of consumer demand to be created by expenditures of the welfare state to take care of the needs of war industry communities and to lessen poverty, preventable disease, and misery living conditions. Some help can also come from taking down restrictions on foreign trade and making trade agreements with the members of the socialist bloc. The demand for these steps from the business world is increasing.

A prediction that they would soon be taken was recently made by Philip Cortney, Chairman of the U.S. Council of the International Chamber of Commerce, an organization of business men who see normal trade relations between all nations as an essential condition of a warless world. After a recent visit to Moscow Mr. Cortney reported that leaders of the Soviet Chamber of Commerce had assured him of their eagerness to negotiate with business men in the capitalist world for the removal of barriers to increased trade. He is presenting to the Paris meeting of his organization a code of fair trade practices. If adopted it will then be negotiated with Soviet trade officials. All this means that if the time allowed for

the Soviet proposal is used in sufficient planning, the economic derangement caused by ending the cold war and total disarmament is not an insuperable obstacle. Consequently those who want a warless world should now be creating political pressure for the planning needed to prevent total disarmament from bringing economic suffering to any section of the population.

Seymour Harris, Professor of Political Economy at Harvard has just added to the above his belief that we can prosper without the present defense budget of \$46 billion which is more than half the total Federal budget, and the equivalent of about ten per cent of our gross national product.

He presents a plan, in the *N. Y. Times* Sunday Magazine section for November 8, 1959, on the basis of cutting the \$46 billion defense budget in half—"a reasonable goal for a genuine disarmament agreement."

He would return about half this saving to the public in the form of a tax cut. The remaining part he would have the Treasury spend "directly on non-defense programs." He specifies the areas in which the Government has been "underspending for years":

. . . education, urban renewal, housing, pollution, irrigation, conservation, flood control, navigation, forestation, airport improvement, highways, hospitals and health services, and social security . . . These and other social needs offer ideal substitutes for defense spending to help keep employment and output high.

Areas where military industries are concentrated would need special help.

If these policies are adopted, he says:

. . . we may confidently expect that substantial cuts in military outlays will not prove disastrous to the economy. But these policies require planning now, to avoid delay when the time comes.

A positive response to the challenge of the Soviet total disarmament proposal is beginning to come from the scientific world. Shortly after Premier Khrushchev left a committee of 17 notable scientists, including 3 Nobel Prize winners, proposed to the Democratic Party Advisory Council at a special session that the government set up a new agency, entirely apart from the Departments of State and Defense, on the technical problems involved in total disarmament. This would be "a permanent laboratory for study of disarmament problems by first rank scientists." The hope was expressed that it would later become international.

After visiting a number of Soviet laboratories, with five American scientists, Chairman John A. McCone of the US Atomic Energy Commission declared that both the US and the USSR would gain from the peaceful development of atomic energy. He said his inspection trip followed by one of Soviet scientists here was one of the essential preliminaries to determining the extent and nature of collaboration.

There are signs of awakening to the need for disarmament and cooperative relations with the Soviet people in the labor movement. The recent conference of the United Automobile Workers Union passed a resolution on international affairs sharply differing from the reactionary cold war, no contact, policy previously adopted by the AFL-CIO national convention. After aiming a lot of words at the USSR, China and other socialist nations as "aggressors", the resolution recognized the scientific and industrial progress in the Soviet Union; declared "the pursuit of peace by every honorable means is not a pious slogan but a condition of survival." It said that Premier Khrushchev's visit to America opens a crack to be pried into, an opening on a less frightening future. Then it went on to assert that "no human aspiration needs recognition today so urgently as the universal hope for disarmament." Then it added: "Cooperative coexistence is possible. Competition between the Soviet system and the democratic societies assuredly can take place peacefully."

The International Woodworkers Union, meeting in Minneapolis immediately after the AFL-CIO Convention, defied the AFL-CIO resolution of non-contact with Soviet leaders by a unanimous resolution instructing its officers to work for an exchange of delegations of the IWA and the woodworkers of the Soviet Union.

In Chicago more than a thousand persons, mostly union members—with hundreds standing along the walls for two-and-a-half hours—listened to Harry Bridges, President of the International Longshoremen's and Warehousemen's Union, a recent visitor to the USSR, charge George Meany and Walter Reuther with "putting the union label on the cold war . . . Take away the labor support and the cold war propaganda stands nakedly exposed for what it is" he declared. He urged full support for a summit meeting of the heads of states; called for an end to nuclear weapons tests; disengagement in Berlin; disarmament on a world scale; increased trade

and a stepped-up program of exchange between the Soviet Union and the United States." He said, "Let the American trade unionists visit the Soviet Union and see for themselves as I did a few months ago."

The question is: will the understanding of the need for universal disarmament grow easy enough and large enough to prevent our government from defeating the world wide demand for it by confining agreement to partial disarmament. It is the day of decision for the nations. They must either agree to learn war no more and beat their swords into ploughshares, that is, use atomic energy for peaceful purposes only, or attempt to destroy each other. The ending of war by total disarmament is no longer an ancient prophetic vision. It is the only possible way to escape the consequences of using atomic energy in preparation for warfare. Which is it to be? The decision depends upon friendly discussion and then agreement between the two great powers—the United States and the Soviet Union.

Competitive Peaceful Coexistence

The third part of the threefold challenge from the Soviet Government and people that Premier Khrushchev left with us asked us to join in mutually beneficial competition to show whose way of life can contribute more to meeting the "material and spiritual" needs of mankind, and to the development of all the capacities of the whole human race. This part of the challenge did not get as much response as the other two. The purpose of it is to put concrete content into the term peaceful coexistence. Without this it becomes just another pious phrase. Premier Khrushchev recognized this danger in his article on peaceful coexistence in the October, 1959, *Foreign Affairs*:

Those in the West who believe that war is to their benefit have not abandoned their schemes . . . there is yet no guarantee they will not attempt to set them in motion. That is why it is necessary to continue an active struggle in order that the policy of peaceful coexistence may triumph through the world not in words but deeds.

This proposal for friendly competition has its background in the development of the Soviet Union. A guiding slogan for finishing the first Five Year Plan on time was "To overtake and surpass the leading industrial nations, particularly the United States."

To produce excellence and speed in production friendly competitive contests were carried on between plants, departments, shops and workers. They still are. This procedure is called "socialist competition." It is a combination of competition and cooperation because methods are shared and results pooled to the benefit of all concerned.

Similarly the proposed international competition would be beneficial to both sides. It would increase the trade that would help each side develop more economic strength as mutual economic relations did in the early thirties. In this process the tensions surviving from the cold war would be lessened according to the principle that mutually beneficial trade increases understanding and goodwill. Premier Khrushchev mentioned this in presenting the Soviet disarmament proposal to the UN. To succeed in its purpose of showing the full strength of each system to the world this mutually beneficial competition has to become cooperative. This it would do, as Premier Khrushchev pointed out, by removing international restrictions on trade and cultural exchange and, in discussing ideological differences, to refrain from name calling and accusations. This cooperative competition is what friendship between the United States and the Soviet Union means today.

The larger and longer significance of this challenge to competitive, mutually beneficial coexistence is that it offers the only way to change the social order without the armed conflict which today means nuclear war. The long and widely accepted belief that this cannot be done without war has now to yield to the categorical imperative that it has to be done because, as both sides admit, neither can win a nuclear war.

According to James Reston of the *N. Y. Times* our first response to the Soviet challenge to peaceful competition appeared before Premier Khrushchev arrived. It was framed in response to this expected proposal:

He will undoubtedly be told that he can have all the peaceful competition he wants provided it is really peaceful and not interrupted by Communist military pressure as in the present situation in Laos. . . . without the elimination of military pressure no amount of talk about peaceful competition is likely to lessen the friction between the two worlds.

In implying Soviet responsibility in Laos the State Department admitted it had no evidence, and none has been found since. (The UN subcommittee could find no evidence; not *any* outside interven-

tion, in fact.) Moreover, the Soviet Government had proposed restoration of the original International Commission for Laos and a conference of the countries that attended the 1954 Geneva conference on China, as an appropriate procedure to bring about settlement of the dispute. Total disarmament would end the question of military pressure on both sides. It would also end the rearmament of West Germany and by doing so remove the chief obstacle to an agreement with the Soviet Union on the whole German issue. Because of all they have suffered from Germany the attitude of both Soviet government and people toward the West Berlin problem, and the future unification of Germany, would be different once the threat of a Germany armed with nuclear weapons were removed.

After Premier Khrushchev arrived, Vice-President Nixon is reported, on October 7, in Washington, to have challenged the Soviet Union to renounce subversion as well as open aggression so that "peaceful competition can remain peaceful." He said no word about our renouncing subversion, which is one of the functions of our Central Intelligence Agency. He next suggested:

... that we broaden the competition to include the higher cultural and spiritual values that characterize the true forward march of civilization.

Is it possible that the Vice-President has never read Premier Khrushchev's repeated insistence on competition in meeting the "material and spiritual needs of mankind?"

On November 4 in Los Angeles, Mr. Nixon enlarged his distortions of the Soviet challenge by bringing in the religious issue:

... the greatest mistake is to meet the Communists on their own ground of atheistic materialism. Man needs a higher purpose in life than the satisfaction of his material needs.

He added that we should welcome Premier Khrushchev's challenge to peaceful competition and declared: "The United States and our people will never stand for being second best." This puts the issue of the technical and moral strength of our system on the level of a cheer leader at a college football game.

On almost the same level, according to the *N. Y. Times*, our UN Delegation leader, Henry Cabot Lodge, accepted the Soviet challenge to peaceful competition in many fields but told the Americans they must work to make their system succeed. He also said that while the challenge of the Communist world is serious:

. . . there is an even bigger challenge and that is the challenge presented by the millions of people in under-developed lands.

In his British broadcast President Eisenhower had suggested Soviet cooperation to meet this need:

There are . . . 700,000,000 people who today are living without sufficient clothing and health facilities . . . I think the biggest cooperative job in the world is that this civilization, including the Soviets, ought to address itself to this problem on a cooperative basis.

In presenting the Soviet proposal for general and complete disarmament to the UN Assembly, Premier Khrushchev said:

. . . The Soviet Union would also be prepared to join other peoples in rendering economic assistance to the so-called underdeveloped countries by using a part of the means that would be made available in the Soviet Union and other states by the conclusion of an international agreement on disarmament and the reduction of military budgets. We have already stated our readiness to assume such undertakings, and I am empowered by my government to say the same again from the rostrum of the General Assembly.

Briefing the National Association of Broadcasters on our foreign policy, on October 16, Assistant Secretary of State for Public Affairs, Andrew H. Berding, from whose speech we have already quoted, said:

. . . Peaceful coexistence is a Soviet device to stay out of war, or to postpone conflict, while the international Communist movement continues its manifest and manifold effort to bring about the worldwide triumph of communism over capitalism.

Does this mean that a majority in the State Department would rather have nuclear war than peaceful competitive coexistence? Or does it just mean that Mr. Berding in his career in intelligence work and public relations has never had time to learn about the need of the Soviet people to avoid further delay in their economic development from war?

Mr. Berding went on to describe peaceful coexistence as both a "prolonged armistice" and a "truce". This nonsense comes from the error of separating one part of Premier Khrushchev's challenge from the other two. The ability to proceed with peaceful, competitive coexistence depends upon both ending the cold war and securing total disarmament. How can total disarmament be either a "prolonged armistice" or a "truce?"

In striking contrast to this State Department thinking divorced

from objective reality is the utterance of the United Auto Workers Union, already quoted:

No human aspirations needs recognition today so urgently as the universal hope for disarmament. Cooperative existence is possible. Competition between the Soviet system and the democratic societies assuredly can take place peacefully.

The Return to Barbarism

The deepest significance of the Soviet challenge to friendly competition in meeting the "material and spiritual" needs of mankind is that it would halt the present trend toward the destruction of civilization and the return to barbarism. One of the warning signs of our times is the extent to which the erosion of civilization has gotten in to our minds and spirits from apathy to the consequences of the use of more and more deadly weapons against non-combatants. In Korea we burned to death with jellied gasoline innocent peasants with their wives and children, their livestock and crops, their homes. In Hiroshima and Nagasaki we blasted with atomic fire tens of thousands of men, women and children who had never lifted a hand against us, disfigured thousands more, and poisoned the blood stream and genetic capacities of other thousands. Now our government is preparing to do this on a hundred times larger scale. The fact that we do not rebel against this inhumanity means that, under this indifference, the spirit of barbarism lies within us. In the relations between organized social groups, the beginning of the humane spirit which is the moral dynamic of civilization was when warring tribes discovered that wars of extermination were too costly in the loss of needed lives. How much would it profit us to learn that from greater Hiroshimas, some of them on our own soil?

Again an inexorable choice has come to us. It is either to achieve worldwide, complete disarmament and proceed to settle the issues between the two social systems now clashing by mutually beneficial, cooperative competition, or complete the return to barbarism.

Which will it be?

The Pressing Need

Whether the answer that will bring more abundant life to our civilization instead of the death that now threatens will come in time, depends upon whether enough of our people receive and use the knowledge without which they will perish. Consequently to get

that knowledge to others is the duty of those who have it.

One urgent part of that duty is to save our nation from the consequences of the "cult of personality" which is the product of the sensationalist journalism that is one of our virulent national diseases. It discusses international as well as national affairs in terms of personalities rather than analysis of facts and policies. In the matter now before us it presents the proposals that Premier Khrushchev brought from his government and people as though they were his individual creation. Our people need to understand that they have been listening to much more than a man. Through him there spoke a long historic policy of the Soviet Union which began immediately after the revolution. It was not devised by wishful thinking. It came out of the application of ancient moral principles to the concrete needs of the nation for peace and friendly relations, as these needs appeared from time to time. Consequently it is grounded on objective reality. Thus it now extends its scope to meet the common need of mankind to escape the threat of unbounded death and destruction.

The other knowledge our people now urgently need is the facts about the purpose and nature of the Soviet proposals and the extent to which they represent the Soviet peoples. They need, point by point, the truth that will save them from being deceived by the campaign of distortions and falsehoods designed to prevent total disarmament and friendly, competitive coexistence, a campaign which is developing in ways similar to the campaign that misled them deceitfully into the cold war.

On the day these concluding sentences are written, Nov. 8, 1959, evidence of this campaign of distortion is highlighted in the statements of Willam J. Jorden, former correspondent in Moscow who begins an article in the Review of the Week section of the *N. Y. Times* with these words:

We can be sure that the Soviet Union and those who follow and depend upon it, have not changed their minds about turning the world into a Communist-run monolith, and doing so by any means that promise success.

The truth is mighty and will prevail—when the minority who know it are able to convince a sufficient majority to see it and put it into effect. In the world crisis in which we are now involved *this has to be done in time or it cannot be done at all*. It is a matter of collective life or death.

Which will it be?

Appendix

To assess the significance of the Eisenhower-Khrushchev exchange, it is helpful to examine the joint statement at the conclusion of Premier Khrushchev's conversations with President Eisenhower, and to note what each leader told the people of his country when the visit was over.

Also, evidence that the U.S. Government is developing a positive attitude toward the Khrushchev challenges can be seen in the address of Secretary of State Herter on November 16, 1959. The documentation is appended.

UNITED STATES—SOVIET COMMUNIQUE

Washington, September 27, 1959

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U.S.S.R., N. S. Khrushchev, and President Eisenhower have had a frank exchange of opinions at Camp David.

In some of these conversations the United States Secretary of State Herter and Soviet Foreign Minister Gromyko, as well as other officials from both countries, participated.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and the President have agreed that these discussions have been useful in clarifying each other's position on a number of subjects. The talks were not undertaken to negotiate issues.

It is hoped, however, that their exchanges of views will contribute to a better understanding of the motives and position of each, and thus to the achievement of a just and lasting peace.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and the President of the United States agreed that the question of general disarmament is the most important one facing the world today. Both Governments will make every effort to achieve a constructive solution of this problem.

In the course of the conversations an exchange of views took place on the question of Germany, including the question of a peace treaty with Germany, in which the positions of both sides were expounded.

With respect to the specific Berlin question, an understanding was reached, subject to the approval of the other parties directly concerned, that negotiations would be reopened with a view to achieving a solution which would be in accordance with the interests of all concerned and in the interest of the maintenance of peace.

In addition to these matters, useful conversations were held on a number of questions affecting the relations between the Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and the United States. These subjects included the question of trade between the two countries. With respect to an increase in exchanges of persons and ideas, substantial progress was made in discussions between officials and it is expected that certain agreements will be reached in the near future.

The Chairman of the Council of Ministers of the U. S. S. R. and the President of the United States agreed that all outstanding international questions should be settled not by the application of force but by peaceful means through negotiation.

Finally, it was agreed that an exact date for the return visit of the President to the Soviet Union next spring would be arranged through diplomatic channels.

Excerpts from the
NEWS CONFERENCE IN WASHINGTON
(Transcript appearing in *N. Y. Times* without editing.)

PRESIDENT DWIGHT D. EISENHOWER
September 28, 1959.

[Answers to reporters' questions are here grouped according to subject matter].

MR. KHRUSHCHEV'S RECEPTION IN THE U. S.

First of all, I want to thank the American people. I think their restraint and their conduct on the whole was a credit to them. And if there is a better understanding on the part of Mr. Khrushchev of our people, of their aspirations, of their general attitudes about international questions, and particularly about their desire for peace, then that has been done by the American people.

I invited Mr. Khrushchev, as you know, to come here so that we might have a chance to discuss some of the obvious reasons for tensions in the world, and particularly between our . . . two countries, because of the outstanding unsettled matters.

I did not ask him here for substantive negotiations, because these are impossible without the presence of our associates. But, I thought that through these conversations . . . some of the ice might be melted.

THE KHRUSHCHEV PERSONALITY

Well, he is a dynamic and arresting personality. He is a man that uses every possible debating method available to him. He is capable of great flights, you might say, of mannerism . . . and disposition, from one almost negative difficult attitude, to the most easy, affable, genial type of discussion.

. . . I think the American people sensed as they [he] went around that they were seeing a man who is an extraordinary personality, there is no question about it.

BERLIN

Now, the Chairman and I discussed the Berlin question at length. Now, as you know, no specific negotiations can be carried out on such questions as this without our allies, but you will read the communiqué which brings up this point and said that negotiations are to be undertaken after making proper arrangements, so, in the aim to get a solution that will protect the legitimate interests of the Soviets, the East Germans, the West Germans, and above all, the Western people.

And, over and above this, we agreed . . . that these negotiations should not be prolonged indefinitely but there could be no fixed time limit on them.

[A further question on the time element on the Berlin problem brought this answer]:

Well, of course, there can be no fixed limit. We do say this, all of us agree that this is an abnormal situation, all the world does.

Here is a free city, sitting inside a Communist country, and 110 miles from the Western Germany to which it feels it is a part. Therefore, the only way you can get a solution is by negotiations that will probably take some time, and we agree that these would not be unnecessarily or unduly extended, but we did say there is no fixed time . . . to which they are limited.

[Once again concerning Berlin and the time factor]:

. . . Now, I personally think that the question is answered right there [in the communique] There is no fixed . . . time on this. No one is under duress, no one is under any kind of threat and, as a matter of fact, he stated emphatically that never had he any intention to give anything that was to be interpreted as duress or compulsion.

[A final question on Berlin negotiations: “. . . could you tell us whether we will be guided by the same standards and principles that we had before, namely, that any solution must guarantee Allied rights there and protect the freedom of West Berliners?”]

I can't guarantee anything of this kind for the simple reason, I don't know what kind of a solution may finally prove acceptable, as I say, but you must start out with this: The situation is abnormal. It was brought about by a truce, after the end of the war, an armistice, and it put . . . a number of free people in a very awkward position.

Now, we've got to find a system that will be really acceptable to all the people in that region, including those most concerned, the West Berliners.

SUMMIT MEETING.

[A first question: Could the President estimate when it would be held?]

No, I can't guess. I can't guess because, first of all, I will report to all of my interested associates everything I can think of on this visit I just had, and I will seek their reactions. . . . I wouldn't want to make any guess now because there were just two of us talking and neither of us tried to fix . . . any real time.

[A second question: Have the conditions previously stated by the President for going to a summit conference now been met or are they still to be met in further negotiations?]

I would say . . . the conversations have, so far as I am personally concerned, removed many of the objections that I have heretofore held; but, again, this is a matter for negotiation and consultation with our Allies.

DISARMAMENT

[The questioner said Mr. Khrushchev used the phrase “the strictest comprehensive control”. Does he apply that to all disarmament or only to the total disarmament scheme he laid before the U. N.?

He [Khrushchev] said constantly in talking about disarmament. . . . “I want you to study the proposal I made”. He did not add anything in the way of details to me. I did point out to him that we had allies, that we had made comprehensive plans and programs, proposals of our own, in the past; that

Britain had just proposed another one in the United Nations, and that at this moment I had a very comprehensive committee under the chairmanship of Mr. Coolidge studying our whole past history in this matter and trying to discover whether we had anything new.

So, . . . the details of exactly the degree of strict control, I didn't go into it at all.

[And another question on disarmament: Did the President and the Premier set any goals for cutting military budgets?]

No. As a matter of fact, the reason I avoided budgets is a very simple one, because I don't believe there is any comparison of budgets between countries where everything is directed, and where costs really cannot be compared.

But, I did say this: No nation could be more anxious than ours to get rid of this, some of this burden, as long as we could with security, and with justice and honor, do it.

RESULTS OF THE TALKS

. . . The most that could be done here . . . is a beginning.

I think that there are a number of people close to him [Khrushchev] that are quite aware of some of the problems that come about unless we do melt some ice. For example, he, himself, deplored the need for spending so much money on defenses. We tried, between ourselves, to talk for a little bit about our comparative costs, therefore how we could calculate just exactly how much of our wealth is going into these things that are, after all, negative and sterile and purely defensive.

Well, this was an interesting exercise, but, of course, we got nowhere except his continued insistence, they're just too expensive, we must find better ways.

The same way with the man [Vasily S. Yemelyanov, chief of the Soviet Administration for Peaceful Uses of Atomic Energy] who was talking to Mr. McCone [Chairman of the U. S. Atomic Energy Commission]. He pointed out that their effort to develop this program of peaceful use of atomic energy, he said we must do it together because it is just too expensive for one country alone.

So, in a number of ways you find, if the ice is melted, an awareness on their part, not only the one that great wars are unthinkable, that's in the background; but in many ways, detailed ways, they are finding out—we just have to do something that's a little bit more reasonable than what we have been doing.

Excerpts from an ADDRESS IN THE PALACE OF SPORTS IN MOSCOW

PREMIER NIKITA S. KHRUSHCHEV

September 28, 1959.

. . . The twentieth century is a century of the greatest flourishing of human thought and genius. In our time people create with their own hands the things that mankind dreamed of for centuries, expressing these dreams in tales, which seemed to be sheer fantasy.

Must we, in this period of the flourishing of human genius which is penetrating the secrets of nature and harnessing its mighty forces, put up

with the preservation of relations that existed between people when man was still a beast?

If in those distant times these relations could be explained by man's being in the first stage of his development and differing but little from animals, today, when man has reached an unparalleled level in the development of his scientific knowledge and subordinates, step by step, the forces of nature to his will, making them serve society, today nothing can justify the preservation of such relations as existed between primitive people.

Our time can and should become a time of the realization of great ideals, a time of peace and progress.

The Soviet Government realized this long ago. Precisely for this reason we have repeatedly offered the Great Powers to arrange a summit meeting so as to exchange views on urgent international problems. When we made these proposals, we believed in man's reason. We believed that, given a wise approach, the proponents of various political views, countries with different social systems, will be able to find a common language so as to resolve correctly and in the interests of consolidating peace the contemporary problems that alarm all mankind.

In our age of great technical progress, in conditions when there are states with different social systems, international problems cannot be resolved successfully otherwise than on principles of peaceful coexistence. There is no other way.

Those people who say they do not understand what peaceful coexistence is, and are fearful of it, contribute, willingly or unwillingly, to the further development of the cold war which will certainly extend if we do not interfere and stop it. It will reach a pitch where a spark might result capable of producing a world war.

Much would perish in this war. It would be too late to discuss what peaceful coexistence means when the talking will be done by such frightful means of destruction as atomic and hydrogen bombs, as ballistic rockets which are practically impossible to locate and which are capable of delivering nuclear warheads to any part of the globe. To disregard this is to shut one's eyes, stop one's ears and bury one's head as the ostrich does when in danger.

. . . We must display the reason of man, confidence in this reason, confidence in the possibility of reaching agreement with statesmen of different countries, and mobilize people by joint efforts to avert the war danger. It is necessary to have the will power and courage to go against those who persist in continuing the cold war. It is necessary to bar the road to it, to thaw the ice and normalize international relations.

I must say from this high platform to the Muscovites, to all our people, the government and the Party that President Dwight Eisenhower of the United States has displayed wise statesmanship in assessing the present international situation, that he has displayed courage and will power.

Despite the complexity of the situation which prevails in the United States, he, the person who enjoys the full confidence of his people, has come out with a proposal to exchange visits between the heads of government of our two countries. We give our due to this important initiative aimed at consolidating peace.

Undertaking this step, he was confident that we would accept the hand he offered us, since we have repeatedly approached both President Eisenhower and the other heads of government on this question. And the President of the United States was not mistaken.

Dear comrades, I report to you with satisfaction that we have fulfilled a part of the agreement with President Eisenhower on the exchange of visits. Availing ourselves of the President's kind invitation, we have undertaken a trip to the United States and have had important meetings and talks there.

[Following these introductory remarks, Premier Khrushchev reviewed his travels from city to city in the United States: Washington, New York, Los Angeles, San Francisco, Des Moines, Pittsburgh, back to Washington and Camp David where the conversations with President Eisenhower took place.]

. . . I will tell you with all frankness, dear comrades, that I got the impression from the talks and discussions of concrete questions with the United States President that he sincerely wants to end the state of cold war, to create normal relations between our two countries, to promote the improvement of relations among all states.

Peace is indivisible now, it cannot be ensured by the efforts of two or three countries only. So we must fight for peace in such a way that all the nations, all the countries, are drawn into this struggle.

We exchanged views with the United States President on questions of disarmament. He said that the United States Government was studying our proposal and that the United States, just as we, wanted complete disarmament under due control.

It seems that there is now no reason for delaying the solution of this question but, on the other hand, the question of disarmament is so serious that we should not press our partners for its solution. The question must be studied, of course, so as to find a solution, which would really create an atmosphere of trust and insure disarmament and peaceful coexistence among states.

So let us not make hurried statements, let us be patient and give the statesmen time to consider our proposals. But we shall not sit on our hands, we shall advocate the need of complete universal disarmament.

We regard our proposals as a basis for agreement. We are ready to discuss any amendments to our document, to our proposals. We are ready to discuss other proposals, too, if they are submitted for the purpose of attaining the same goals as ours.

We exchanged views with the President on the German question also, on the question of concluding a peace treaty. We tried to prove, and I think we were successful in this, that our proposals concerning the peace treaty were incorrectly interpreted in the West.

Some people tried to stir up unnecessary excitement by saying that they are an ultimatum, etc. Those who acted in this way were obviously guided by a desire to prolong the cold war. They went so far as to claim that our proposals on the peace treaty with Germany were something short of a declaration of war. It sure takes some nerve to distort the peaceloving position of the Soviet Union in such a way.

We also exchanged views on the holding of a summit meeting. Both President Eisenhower and I set forth the positions of our two governments and agreed that this meeting is necessary and useful.

. . . I wish to tell you, dear comrades, that I do not doubt the President's intention to exert his will and efforts to reach agreement between our two countries, to create friendly relations between our nations and to solve the urgent problems in the interests of consolidating peace.

At the same time I got the impression that there are forces in America which do not work in the same direction as the President.

These forces are for the continuation of the cold war and for the arms race. I would not be in a hurry to say whether these forces are large or small, influential or not influential, and whether the forces supporting the President—and he is backed by the absolute majority of the American people—can win.

Time is a good adviser, or as the Russian people say, "Take counsel of one's pillow." This is a wise saying. Let us do this, the more so since we have arrived in the afternoon and it is in the evening that I am speaking now. It will take perhaps several such counsels before we clear this up. But we shall not rest idle while waiting for the dawn, we shall not wait to see which way the international relations tilt.

For our part we shall do everything we can to tilt the barometer's hand away from "Storm" and even from "Changeable" to show "Fine."

...In our actions we rely on reason, on truth, on the support of all the people. Moreover, we rely on our great potential.

And let it be known to those who want to continue the cold war so as to turn it sooner or later into a shooting war, that in our time only a madman can start a war and he himself will perish in its flames.

The peoples must strait-jacket these madmen. We believe that sound statesmanship and human genius will triumph. Citing Pushkin: "Hail reason, down with obscurity "

Dear Muscovites! We are boundlessly happy to return home, to see the faces of the Soviet people which are so dear to our hearts.

Long live the great Soviet people, who are successfully building communism under the leadership of the glorious Leninist party.

Long live Soviet-American friendship!

Long live friendship among all the peoples of the world!

Excerpts from an
ADDRESS BEFORE THE NATIONAL FOREIGN TRADE COUNCIL
New York

SECRETARY OF STATE CHRISTIAN A. HERTER
November 16, 1959

That "competition is the life of trade" is a saying that has stood the test of time. Today, we face a test no society has ever fully met: how to make competition the life, not death, of nations.

The problem is urgent as never before because of two facts. One is a revolutionary movement based on great and growing power, which seeks to polarize all international competition around social survival. The other is that, hanging over this conflict, are the means of vast destruction.

How can we meet such competition, yet keep it safely back from the abyss of universal ruin? I will take the second point first.

The paramount question facing our world today is how the great rivalry between political systems can work itself out in the course of history without exploding into thermonuclear war.

Such an explosion has been uncomfortably close more than once in recent years, most lately over Berlin. Last summer, it became clear that the Soviet Union, despite its protests to the contrary, was still engaging in duress in an effort to bring West Berlin under its influence.

KHRUSHCHEV VISIT ASSAYED

Then, President Eisenhower, concluding that the outlook for peace was darkening, determined to turn the course of history away from war and toward a lasting peace. He began by inviting Chairman Khrushchev to visit our country. You know of the meetings to follow. What do all these mean?

So far, the element of duress over Berlin has been submerged; but otherwise, there were few tangible results of the Khrushchev visit, nor were such to be expected. Indeed, it may be better so, for early successes tend to breed self-deceptive euphoria.

The real meaning of the series of high-level meetings is that a new process of communication may be developing through them. I say "may" because only time can tell whether we shall have learned to talk somewhat less at cross-purposes than in the past, and with better understanding of opposing points of view.

Mr. Khrushchev has said that we need to develop a common language, despite the ideological conflict to which he stanchly adheres. Many will find this hard to believe after the years of baffling double-talk. Yet I believe that on certain fundamentals we can find a common language because we have a common interest.

That interest lies simply in the basic will to survive, shared by free men and Communists alike. I think the Soviet leadership is reaching a conclusion similar to our own—that unless the course of events is changed and changed soon both sides face unacceptable risks of general nuclear war, which would approximate mutual suicide.

'RULES OF THE GAME'

Thus, the one area in which a common language has best chance to grow is that of ground rules for the great competition which dominates our time—some "rules of the game"—to keep it within bounds set by the conditions of co-survival.

Such rules must be devised to temper acute political problems which cannot now be fully solved, and to bring under control the spiraling arms race which those problems goad onward. That is the main task for the negotiations that lie in the months and perhaps years ahead.

There are other areas in which a common language can take root, thereby mitigating to some extent the underlying conflict. Shared interests in the arts and sciences, in the essentials of human welfare and everyday life, are now being fostered through many kinds of exchange which we are prepared to expand as fully as the Soviets will reciprocate. In these fields, we are even finding ways of turning competition into cooperation, through such common ventures as the International Geophysical Year. We should never miss a bona fide opportunity to expand the area of cooperation.

Competition will continue to be rugged, however, despite any ground rules or exchange. Mr. Khrushchev makes no bones about his ultimate aims, and we

can certainly expect many sorts of lures and pressures in all parts of the free world, backed with mounting industrial power, designed to confuse, subvert and take over. The need to keep a firm grasp on both sets of facts—the necessity for common ground rules and the aggressive competition—will be a severe test of our political maturity as a people.

It was much simpler when we could think in black and white terms of sheer confrontation with 100 per cent hostile communism. Even today, though the present arms race is dangerous beyond description, it still seems easier to continue on the familiar path than to try to break new ground.

Thus, it will take courage of a high order and strong nerves over a long time to construct a new relationship between the antagonistic systems. But that must be done if civilization is to survive. It is nothing less than this immense and long-term project on which we are now engaged.

[In the next section of his address, Secretary Herter discusses how the United States will meet the competition, without war. He recommends, among other things, that the present deficit in the balance of U.S. economic transactions with other countries be met by freer trade—"by means which enlarge international trade and do not restrict it—by methods which promote competition and the flow of development capital rather than restrict them. . . . We must find solution to our problems through expansion, not curtailment".]

[The concluding paragraphs of Mr. Herter's address follow:]

THE RIGHT TO DIFFER

Chairman Khrushchev sees the future as competition between rival social systems by means other than war. We Americans welcome competition, and we are ready to join him in finding ways of making it securely peaceful.

But perhaps Mr. Khrushchev will agree that each of us has a right to see the future in his own way. We, in the United States, believe that we share with millions of our fellow men, in East and West, a vision differing from his. However various we are in creed, race and culture, we are united in welcoming just this variety. We believe in the God-given multiformity of man, and man's future.

From our point of view, therefore, the competition is not between two uniform, but opposite, social systems. It is a contest to decide whether the great problems of our age can be met better in a free variety of cooperating ways, or in the single starkly monolithic way of communism.

Thus, I would put the challenge differently from Mr. Khrushchev. But I would agree with him that it is profoundly urgent. It calls for every ounce of sacrifice and devotion that you and I, and all like-minded men and women, can muster in the years ahead.

As we move forward in what may become a new era of competitive peace, our chief source of strength will lie not in material things—but in our faith in freedom. The Communists repeatedly proclaim their belief in their creed and system, and its eventual triumph. We must match their expressed belief with faith in our own principles, which spring from man's millennial striving toward freedom.

As against Marxist materialism, we uphold a universal humanism which stresses man's spiritual nature without ignoring his physical needs. We reject

materialism as the main shaping force in human affairs, whether embodied in economic determinism, statism, or in any other system externally imposed upon the individual. We believe that the real dynamic of human life is inner spiritual force working in a cosmos ruled by divine power, law and purpose.

Our main concern is not that the Soviets are trying to outproduce us in pigs, or milk, or even steel. We rejoice at their progress to the extent that it makes for human betterment and for peace.

What we most need to fear is the loss of our own vision and sense of destiny—of our belief in the eventual spread of democratic freedom to all peoples on our planet. In this, we should have a faith as deep and intense as that of the most devoted disciple of communism. We should, above all, demonstrate that faith in action.

Freedom thrives on competition. Therefore, we do not need to look with foreboding on the era ahead. Ours is no perfected system, incapable of further growth. America is still in the making. The most inviting of all frontiers lies ahead. To accept the challenge with courage—yes, with buoyant hope—is to be true to the traditions that made America great.



DISARMAMENT

A LIVE ISSUE CALLING FOR ACTION

PEACEMAKERS: Distribute New Pamphlet Among
Your Neighbors

"TOTAL DISARMAMENT IN FOUR YEARS"

Address of N. S. Khrushchev at UN General Assembly
September 18, 1959
and

Text of Soviet Disarmament Proposals

U.S. Secretary of State, Christian A. Herter says:

Obviously, the disarmament proposal made by Chairman Khrushchev is one which will require very careful examination. . . . Speaking in general terms, I think I can say that the U.S. will go as far on the path toward *controlled* disarmament as any other country. . . .

5½ x 8½ 32 pages

Single Copy 10¢. 10-100 7½¢. 100-500 5½¢.

500 up 4½¢. Postpaid.

Published by

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF
AMERICAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP

114 East 32nd Street

New York 16, N. Y.

(See Announcement of Educational Services on Page 92)

EDUCATIONAL SERVICES

THE EDUCATIONAL SERVICES DIVISION of the National Council makes available a wide variety of material for teachers and students engaged in the study of the U.S.S.R. Loan packets and exhibitions can be obtained by schools, colleges, universities, public libraries, museums and organizations for periods running from one week to a month. Specific assistance on particular phases of Soviet life and activities may be requested. Fees are nominal.

SEND FOR FREE LISTS as noted below:

DOCUMENTARY FILMS OF THE U.S.S.R.

In color, musical accompaniment, English commentary. Films of the Country and the People; Education: Children, Youth, Young People: Agriculture. For home or school, church or auditorium use. All 16mm. Low rental fees.

PHOTOGRAPHIC EXHIBITS OF THE U.S.S.R.

Picture sets on life and activities: Peoples of the Fifteen Republics; Progress and Development; Construction; Industry; Agriculture; Education; The Family; Health; Science; Art; Literature; Theatre; Ballet; Music; Sports and Recreation. Script in English provides picture legends and other information.

LOAN LIBRARY OF BOOKS, BOOKLETS, PAMPHLETS

This material published by the Soviet press in English translation includes books of Fiction; books and pamphlets on Science, Agriculture, Industry, Power Development, Construction, Education, The Family, Art, Theatre, Ballet, Cinema, Sports; also Medical, Political and Economic and Statistical Publications; Guide Books for Travel; Textbooks for Elementary and Secondary Schools (in Russian); Picture and Story Books for Children and Young People (some in English and others in Russian).

PAMPHLETS OF THE N.C.A.S.F. & OTHER PUBLICATIONS

Besides pamphlets of its own imprint, the Council offers for sale or on loan valuable printed material on Soviet life published by other organizations.

Educational Services Division
NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP
114 East 32nd Street New York 16, N. Y.

NATIONAL COUNCIL OF AMERICAN-SOVIET FRIENDSHIP

Established in 1943



Beliefs and Program

OUR BELIEFS

The National Council of American-Soviet Friendship was founded in 1943 to bring about better relations between the United States and the Soviet Union. We hold that understanding and cooperation between these two greatest countries of the earth constitute today the foundation-stone of enduring world peace and the chief safeguard against atomic destruction.

The National Council is a non-partisan organization, with no governmental or political affiliations. Its members differ in their political views and in their appraisal of specific points in the policies of both the U.S.A. and the U.S.S.R. But we believe that the cause of international amity must rise above any shortcomings of either country, that the common interests of the United States and the Soviet Union transcend their disagreements, and that a way can be found for the two systems to live together in peace. We are convinced that such a course will serve the highest interests of our country.

The National Council rejects the thesis that war is inevitable and dedicates itself to the reasonable hope that the United States and the Soviet Union will assume joint leadership in the achievement of a warless world.

We invite patriotic and peace-loving Americans to share in our program for amity, security and peace among the nations.

(As adopted in 1948)

(continued on next page)

OUR PROGRAM

Facts

To provide accurate, up-to-date information to ever widening circles of the American people concerning the major phases of Soviet life and American-Soviet relations, through pamphlets, fact sheets, a news bulletin, pictorial exhibits, documentary films and other material.

Particularly at this time to make these educational services available to libraries, to schools, colleges and universities.

Exchange

To stimulate and bring about increasing cultural, educational and scientific interchange between the two countries, both in written materials and personal visitation.

To encourage visits by rank and file citizens from every part of each country to the other.

To promote good business relations such as will be advantageous to the economies of both countries and will lay a firm basis for peace in prosperous international trade.

Peace

To build wide public support for a positive U.S.A. foreign policy of cooperation with the U.S.S.R. for the safeguarding of peace, primarily within the United Nations, but including such direct negotiations as may be necessary, on a basis of equality and good faith.

To promote international agreements for the control, limitation and reduction of armaments, and cooperation between the United States and the Soviet Union to meet the economic needs in less developed countries and in other ways to serve the welfare of people throughout the world.

Officers in 1959

<i>Chairman</i>	Rockwell Kent
<i>Secretary-Treasurer</i>	R. A. Resika
<i>Executive Director</i>	Richard Morford

Chairmen during Organization's History

Corliss Lamont	1943-1946
Wm. Howard Melish	1946-1949
John A. Kingsbury (Dr. Kingsbury died in 1956)	1949-1956
Rockwell Kent	1957-

Administrative Secretary

Theodore Bayer (Mr. Bayer died in 1959)	1946-1959
--	-----------

DATE DUE

[illegible]

GAYLORD		PRINTED IN U.S.A.
---------	--	-------------------

PRINTED IN U.S.A.

Gaylord 
PAMPHLET BINDER
 Syracuse, N. Y.
Stockton, Calif.

E183.8 .R9W2

The story of American-Soviet relations,

Princeton Theological Seminary-Speer Library



1 1012 00005 3613